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There has been much speculation recently as to the political effect that “moral values” 
have on Americans and much research has shown inconclusive results as far as the effect of 
class. This paper aims to study how class and values, including moral values and postmaterialist 
values, interact with politics in the United States.  The analyses performed to determine these 
effects include crosstabulation and logistical regressions and will include data from the National 
Election Studies (NES).  It is found that postmaterialist values have little effect on political 
behavior but in separate analyses, class and moral values have increasing influences on vote 
choice and partisan identification.  It is also determined that moral values currently has more 
influence on presidential votes, but there is no clear indication that values are consistent 
























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................ vii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................. 6 
Realignment .................................................................................................................... 6 
Class.............................................................................................................................. 10 
Values ........................................................................................................................... 18 
CHAPTER THREE: CLASS........................................................................................................ 23 
Data ............................................................................................................................... 23 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 26 
Hypotheses.................................................................................................................... 27 
Results And Discussion ................................................................................................ 29 
Conclusions................................................................................................................... 43 
CHAPTER FOUR: VALUES....................................................................................................... 44 
Data ............................................................................................................................... 46 




Postmaterialism Results and Discussion....................................................................... 53 
Moral Values Results and Discussion........................................................................... 62 
Conclusions................................................................................................................... 69 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................... 70 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 76 
APPENDIX A: EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS AND THE SOLID SOUTH .......................... 81 
APPENDIX B: NUMBERS OF CASES IN EACH TABLE ....................................................... 83 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 88 
 vi
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: Presidential and House Elections and Party Identification By Income Level and 
Decade, 1952 – 2004 ................................................................................................................ 30 
Table 3.2: Low-High Difference in Democratic Presidential Vote By Region, Income Level, and 
Decade, 1952 – 2004 ................................................................................................................ 33 
Table 3.3: Low-High Differences in Democratic House Vote and Party ID By Region, Income 
Level, and Decade, 1952 – 2004............................................................................................... 34 
Table 3.4: Class on Presidential Vote, House Vote, and Party ID by Decade, 1952-2004 .......... 38 
Table 3.5: Class on Presidential Vote by Decade and Region, 1952-2004 .................................. 40 
Table 3.6: Class on House Vote and Party ID by Decade and Region, 1952-2004...................... 42 
Table 4.1: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on Presidential Vote Choice Nationwide, 
1980s-2000s .............................................................................................................................. 54 
Table 4.2: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on House Vote Choice Nationwide, 1980s-
2000s......................................................................................................................................... 56 
Table 4.3: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on Partisan Identification By Region 1980s – 
2000s......................................................................................................................................... 58 
Table 4.4: Moral Values on Presidential Vote Choice Nationwide, 1980s-2000s ....................... 63 
Table 4.5: Moral Values on House Vote Choice and Partisan Identification Nationwide, 1980s-
2000s......................................................................................................................................... 64 
Table 4.6: Moral Values and Presidential Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s ..................... 67 
Table 4.7: Moral Values and House Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s .............................. 68 
 vii
 
Table 5.1: Class and Moral Values on Presidential Vote 1980s-2000s........................................ 71 
Table 5.2: Moral Values and Class on Presidential Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s....... 73 
Table 5.3: Mean Values and Abortion Attitude Scores by Religious Group................................ 75 
Table 5.4: Mean Moral Conservatism and Abortion Scores by Party Identification, 2004.......... 79 
Table A.1: Percentage of Evangelical Christians in the South and Non-South............................ 82 
Table A.2: Percentage of Voters With Evangelical Religious Preference.................................... 82 
Table B.1 Numbers of Low- and High-Income Respondents by Region and Decade, 1952-2004 
(Corresponds to Tables 3.2 and 3.3) ......................................................................................... 84 
Table B.2: Number of Total Income Respondents by Decade (Corresponds to Table 3.4) ......... 84 
Table B.3: Number of Total Income Respondents By Decade and Region, 1952-2004 
(Corresponds with Tables 3.5 and 3.6) ..................................................................................... 85 
Table B.4: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents by Model (Corresponds with 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2).................................................................................................................... 85 
Table B.5: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents to Partisan Identification by 
Region and Decade (Corresponds to Table 4.3) ....................................................................... 86 
Table B.6: Number of Total Moral Values Respondents by Decade (Corresponds to Tables 4.4 
and 4.5) ..................................................................................................................................... 86 
Table B.7: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents to Partisan Identification by 
Region and Decade (Corresponds to Table 4.3) ....................................................................... 86 
Table B.8: Number of Class and Moral Values Respondents to Presidential Vote by Region and 
Decade (Corresponds to Tables 5.1 and 5.2) ............................................................................ 87 
 viii
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The presidential election of 2004 elicited many remarks from the media about a strong 
and growing political division among Americans: values.  It was widely cited in the days 
following the election that a plurality of American voters, 22 percent, chose “moral values” as 
the most important issue in that particular election.  Shortly after this statistic arose, the article 
would read something like “Among the 22 percent who cited it as their top issue, Mr. Bush won 
by 79 percent to 18 percent” (Mulligan 2004).  The conclusion many reporters drew from these 
facts was that there was a new and growing constituency in the American electorate made up of 
individuals whose traditional Christian values compelled them to vote for a conservative 
Christian Republican president over a moderate Christian Democratic challenger (Feldmann 
2004; Mooney and Mishra 2004). 
The “values divide” has been studied by social scientists for years now, with an extensive 
body of literature being written after the historically narrow presidential victory of George W. 
Bush in the 2000 general election.  Countless books, editorial articles, and blog entries have been 
penned on the divisive nature of moral values.  Other scholars have suggested that values issues 
like abortion have an intense effect on political behavior and the effect may be growing 
(Abramowitz 1995).  Coupled with the exit poll data from the past two presidential elections 
cited earlier, it would seem as though moral values are a strong motivator for political behavior 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
As the moral values issue was supposedly growing, social class was said to be declining 
as a relevant political cleavage (Clark and Lipset 2001).  Although some vehemently claim that 
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there is an enduring relationship between class and political behavior, most insist that other 
cleavages render class nearly meaningless when voters decide for whom to vote or with whom to 
identify.  One of the most ardent promoters of the latter view is Ronald Inglehart, whose 
hypothesis about postmaterialism has fundamentally changed the debate about the relationship 
between class and politics.  Inglehart’s postmaterialist hypothesis states that as economic and 
physical well-being increases, intangible cultural values gain importance at the expense of 
material economic issues.  Thus, according to Inglehart, decades of recovery from two world 
wars and unprecedented economic growth should render the United States ripe for a transition 
from materialist to postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1990). 
There is, however, a body of literature which reaffirms the significance of class in the 
minds of the electorate (see Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).  For example, there is evidence that 
occupational realignments have been occurring so that upper class occupations and lower class 
occupations have been changing in political behavior while overall political behavior has not 
changed much at all.  Others suggest that the political disparity between upper and lower income 
earners has been growing since the 1950s (Stonecash et al 2000).  Also, some authors have felt 
compelled to write pieces dismissing the values hypothesis outright.  Morris Fiorina (2005), for 
example, discusses how pundits and scholars have greatly exaggerated the values divide.  He 
suggests that most Americans more or less agree with each other on major issues while the outer 
fringes of the left and right have become the most outspoken, raising specters of a new silent 
majority. 
So which is more important to Americans: class or culture?  This will be the main 
research question of my thesis.  Much talk is heard from the media, books, and politicians in 
 2
 
general about a new “culture war” that is taking place in America’s ballot boxes.  And, when 
politicians discuss increasing entitlement programs or another tax cut for the rich, there is much 
talk about “class warfare.”  Which of these “wars” is attracting the attention of American voters?  
Do individuals vote their pocketbooks or their holy books?  This discussion will attempt to 
empirically test hypotheses offered by myself and other scholars of political behavior as well as 
the pundits who continue the use of the culture war metaphor.  Hopefully, a new understanding 
might be realized by taking some different approaches to the class and values discussion. 
It is widely understood and accepted that the United States is not a monolithic bloc.  
Certain states and regions have distinctive traits independent of other states and regions, the most 
glaring example of which is probably the eleven states of the old confederacy.  For nearly a 
century, the southern United States gave an overwhelming percentage of its electoral votes and 
House and Senate seats to the Democratic party.  During the mid- to late-20th century, the south 
gradually shifted parties; presently it is Republican at all levels with few exceptions.  As the 
South drifted toward the Republicans, the rest of the country, especially the Northeast and West, 
moved even more slowly toward the Democrats.  Does this change reflect a shift from class 
politics to values politics and cut across class lines?  Or have class issues been exacerbated in 
these regions?  Is class becoming more important in some areas while cultural values make gains 
in others?  Are the same cultural issues salient in all regions or do separate regions hold different 
cultural values? 
The way minorities view these conflicts might have an effect on their political behavior 
that would divide them from the rest of the country.  For example, African-American voters have 
historically voted for the Democratic party overwhelmingly, especially since the Democrats 
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pushed through the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.  Minority groups tend to act in unison 
politically, decreasing any class effect.  What racial, ethnic, and gender-related differences are 
there in terms of class- or values-based political behavior? 
When discussing how cultural differences are changing politics, one cannot overlook the 
undeniable influence of evangelical Christians.  These individuals, mostly southerners and those 
with lower incomes, are now considered to be a formidable force in modern American politics 
due to both increasing numbers and political activity (see Appendix A).  Where and how is this 
rise influencing class and values politics?  Is the effect really that of evangelical Christians or do 
they simply have more conservative moral values than those with other religious preferences? 
Answers to these questions are all essential contributions required to determine the course 
that American politics has taken, and may provide a forecast of where it is headed.  A nationwide 
shift from class- to values-based preferences could indeed signal a new politics, the kind that was 
discussed by the media as if it was fact.  A lack of such a shift would provide an interesting 
puzzle as to why Americans are electing such obtrusively religious and culturally conservative 
candidates.  A decline in both values- and class-based cleavages would present the possibility of 
starting from scratch; if neither cultural issues nor class issues are relevant to understanding 
political behavior, what is?  An increase in both could signal an increasingly divisive nation.  
From the results, it should be possible to conclude whether the political “culture wars” and “class 
wars” are real, who is winning, and why. 
Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2 consists of a broad literature review which 
seeks to ascertain what researchers have uncovered to date as well as introduce more concepts 
that concern the questions raised here.  Chapter 3 contains empirical tests as to the importance of 
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class in American politics, looking in-depth to discover trends in the nation as a whole and in 
specific regions.  Chapter 4 is a similar exposition on values and politics.  Chapter 5 is a 
discussion which seeks to relate the previous two chapters and answer more questions raised in 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of this thesis is concerned with several important and well-researched themes 
in political science.  Some of these themes form the basis of what political scientists believe to be 
true of American politics.  The central question that this thesis seeks to answer is whether 
underlying shifts have occurred which have realigned the electorate from class-based to values-
based political cleavages.  One assumption on which this research lies is that realignments in the 
bases of partisan attachment and political behavior can and do occur.  Another is that “class” and 
“values” are measurable and relatively exclusive concepts which can be tested against each 
other.  Hence, this thesis relies on the invaluable research social scientists have previously 
performed on these topics.  From this research, one can determine unanswered hypotheses 
concerning these issues and how to best analyze the available data.  The previous literature on 
these topics is discussed at length below. 
Realignment 
Any discussion of shifts in the cleavages of the American electorate must begin with the 
original realignment hypotheses offered by V. O. Key Jr.  In the 1950s, Key authored three 
articles defining this term which would provide political scientists with decades of intense study 
(Key 1952, 1955, 1959).  Realignment was introduced as “an orientation for an attempt to 
formulate a concept of one type of election – based on American experience – which might be 
built into a more general theory of elections” (Key 1955: 3).  Thus, the original concept of 
realignment was one of shifting voter cleavages; that is, members of a particular voter cleavage 
may shift their partisan attachments en masse from one major political party to another.  When 
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such realignments occurred, the “alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate” 
would “persist for several succeeding elections” (Key 1955: 4). 
Key also wrote that there were two types of realignment which were known to take place 
in American politics.  Critical realignment, the more familiar topic, was said to be a sharp and 
immediate change in the electorate (Key 1955).  In one election cycle, individual cleavages 
within the electorate would shift determinedly from either nonalignment to alignment with 
another party or from one alignment to another.  The most obvious example and perhaps the only 
one of its kind is the realignment of 1932 following the Great Depression.  Following the stock 
market crash and the inability of Republicans to effectively control the situation, former 
Republicans and independents overwhelmingly supported the charismatic and optimistic 
Democratic candidate, Franklin Roosevelt.  The mostly class-based cleavages which were 
created during that critical election are said by some to be in existence today, while most believe 
that they have long been demolished (see Clark and Lipset 2001).  The other type of realignment 
noted by Key was secular realignment, during which elections “may mark only steps in a more 
or less continuous creation of new party loyalties and the decay of old” (1959: 198).  Such 
realignments might be missed under the proverbial radar until the cleavages which were being 
created by the realignment became more powerful.  These realignments could be based upon 
lines of religion, class, gender, ethnicity, race, or myriad other group characteristics and can be 
noticed only by looking at the behavior of such groups over time. 
Not long after Key wrote this series, political scientists attempted to add to the original 
hypotheses.  Consistent with Key’s original idea, The American Voter (1960) incorporated the 
concept of realignment into a more broad theory of electoral classification.  In addition to 
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realigning elections, Converse et al. identified two additional types of elections: deviating and 
maintaining.  Deviating elections were said to consist of voters electing a non-majority party 
president in spite of his minority status due to peculiar circumstances of that election such as the 
character of the candidate or salient issue.  These are not realigning elections because the 
majority party rises to power once again after the issue loses salience or candidate becomes 
ineligible for reelection.  Maintaining elections were said to be those which took place after 
realignments and kept the majority party in power.  Realigning elections, then, were elections in 
which either the majority party lost or the majority party was revitalized due to substantial, 
durable shifts in the electorate. 
Gerald Pomper revamped this classification system in the 1960s which left the 
maintaining and deviating elections to their former definitions but divided the Converse et al. 
definition of a realigning election into two types: realigning and converting (1967).  The 
difference between a realigning and converting election was said to be that in a realigning 
election, the majority party changes, while a converting election maintains the status quo of the 
majority party but significantly alters the underlying cleavages which make up the electoral base 
for the parties.  Under this classification system, the 1932 election remains a realigning one 
while the 1896 election, in which the electoral cleavages were significantly and durably changed, 
was a converting one, as the Republican Party remained the majority party.  Significant evidence 
for such a classification of elections was offered through aggregate data; the percentage of the 
vote of each state that went to the Democratic party was analyzed using correlation statistics 
which revealed that several series of presidential elections resulted in changes in bases of state 
support.  Some of these changes resulted in a majority party change while others did not.  Those 
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that caused a change in the majority party were dubbed realigning elections while those which 
resulted in no change were called converting elections. 
Some scholars attempted to expand the concept of realignment again in the 1970s by 
adding new elements.  For example, Walter Dean Burnham’ book on critical elections provided 
evidence that realigning elections took place every thirty years or so (1970).  Such a periodic 
event was enticing for political scientists and caused many to expect that a realignment had 
recently occurred or that one soon would (Lawrence and Fleisher 1987).  But no consensus 
emerged in the coming years concerning such a periodic realignment, which caused many to 
question the validity of the concept itself.  Some have proposed the alternate hypothesis of 
“dealignment” which posited that since individuals were increasingly identifying as neither 
Democratic nor Republican and the national government was consistently divided, neither party 
could be considered the “majority party” in the United States (Norpoth and Rusk 1982).  Others 
insisted that the idea of realignment was far too simplistic to support a real theory about partisan 
change.  Picking up on the dealignment hypothesis, Ladd (1990) contested that electoral cycles 
picked up by realignment scholars were really changes in the political parties themselves rather 
than in the electorate.  David Mayhew, treating realignment as a mature genre consisting of a 
literature canon developed by ten or so authors, argued that realignment is a poor theoretical 
construct through which political shifts might be generalized (2002).  To evidence this claim, he 
arbitrarily determined fifteen points which he believes the canon implies are attributes of 
realignment.  Since all of these points are not seen in the electoral pattern of national 
realignment, he says, the concept itself is largely bunk.  Carmines and Stimson (1981) criticized 
critical realignment as “plausible” but “problematic both theoretically and empirically” (107).  
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Key’s idea of secular realignment, however, was expanded to produce “issue evolution” through 
which “normal partisan change” causes cleavages to separate and new identities to arise, usually 
through additions to the electorate. 
Despite these criticisms, realignment remains a relevant framework through which to 
study electoral shifts for at least two reasons.  One is that despite the lack of consensus on which 
party is the “majority party” in American politics today and in previous years, the original 
concept of realignment does not rely on such a consensus.  The idea is, in its most simplistic 
form, one through which we may study shifting electoral cleavages.  Secondly, realignment does 
not necessarily rely only on shifts in the electorate but can also determine shifts in the party 
platforms.  Whether or not the parties have changed their platforms to accommodate such shifts 
is hardly irrelevant, but contrary to Mayhew’s suggestions it seems impractical as a device 
through which all electoral cleavage shifts might be measured.  In short, neither the people nor 
the parties are static, but realignment measures shifts in the cleavages of the people, regardless of 
party movement.  Realignment, then, is a relevant and useful tool with which we might 
understand how cleavages change in the American electorate when used within its proper 
context.  In this paper, I attempt to examine how cleavages based on class and values have 
shifted individuals’ support for candidates and for partisan identification through a realignment 
perspective. 
Class 
Study of the relationship between class and politics goes back centuries.  Economic 
conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, two dichotomous classes, was the basis of 
Marx’s theories on society in general and politics in particular.  These notions of class conflict 
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formed the basis for many revolutions, wars, political party platforms, and citizen movements.  
Ideological differentiation alone between Marxist nations and liberal capitalist democracies has 
led to international conflicts.  Needless to say, then, the combination of class with politics has a 
long and often violent history.  Within the United States, this combination has not been nearly as 
volatile.  Perhaps as an example of American exceptionism, or perhaps as a by-product of 
relatively stable two-party democracy, the United States has not succumbed to all-out class war 
in the literal sense.  But this does not mean that there is no class conflict, nor does it mean that 
social scientists have not strived to understand the full relationship between class and politics in 
the United States.  In order to achieve this, though, scholars need an understanding of precisely 
what class is and how it can best be measured. 
Class Measurement 
Conceptualization and operationalization of social class has been a hotly debated topic in 
the social sciences for quite some time.  In the 1950s, as the biannual National Election Studies 
(NES) began in earnest, political scientists were inspired to write volumes on the bases of 
political behavior.  Some of the first quantitative studies of class and its relationship to political 
behavior gave the impression of a huge gap between working class and middle class individuals 
(Eulau 1955, 1955a).  Most of these studies were based on the following NES question: “There's 
quite a bit of talk these days about four different social classes.  If you were asked to use one of 
these four names for your social class, which would you say you belonged in - the middle class, 
lower class, working class or upper class?”  Soon after these studies, the authors of The 
American Voter identified both objective (i.e. an indicator such as income or occupation) and 
subjective (i.e. feelings of belonging to a specific social class as above) forms of measuring 
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social class, utilizing both in their studies which found links between “status polarization” and 
individual, political, and economic circumstances.  Soon thereafter, the Alford index of class 
voting was created, which is a dichotomization of individuals computed by “subtract[ing] the 
percentage of persons in nonmanual occupations voting for ‘Left’ parties from the percentage of 
persons in manual occupations voting for ‘Left’ parties” (Alford 1962: 422).  The 1990s saw a 
revitalization of the study of class politics after decades of study which suggested that, according 
to the Alford index, class politics had been declining in nearly every advanced industrial society 
in the world for decades (Clark and Lipset 1991).  It was then that the validity of the Alford 
index was seriously questioned, and class politics was brought back under the microscope.  The 
resumption of intense study on the subject led to two debates: one on how to best conceptualize 
social class and one on how to best operationalize it. 
As many social scientists can no doubt attest, many diverse definitions of class have been 
realized, not all of which may be covered in this review.  Pakulski (1993) noted that the concept 
of social class falls into Sartori’s definition of a “conceptually stretched” concept (Sartori 1970).  
That is, the concept of class has become so loaded and come to mean so many different things to 
different people that the very idea is almost unrecognizable in any objective sense.  According to 
Sartori, the “net result of conceptual straining is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be 
matched by losses in connotative precision” (1035).  This point seems self-evident by the simple 
fact that many scholars are seemingly talking past each other.  Social theorists have taken 
advantage of the situation by debating the validity of Marxist (e.g. relationship to the means of 
production) and gender-related (e.g. women’s relationship to the workplace) themes (Pakulski 
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1993).  Predictably, no consensus on the true definition of class has emerged from these 
discussions.   
Difficulties in agreeing upon a proper conceptualization of class have mirrored a lack of 
consensus in operationalizing class.  Further difficulties have arisen due to the limits of available 
survey data.  While conceptualizations are constrained only by imagination, empirical 
operationalization requires survey data.  When long-term trends are to be studied, the limits of 
the data are readily apparent.  Hout, Brooks, and Manza first brought the Alford index under 
scrutiny in the 1990s.  They wrote that “[b]y lumping together all persons employed in non-
manual occupations in one 'class', and all persons working in manual occupations into the other 
'class', the Alford Index creates artificially high levels of cross-class voting among both groups” 
(1993: 265).  Through writing extensively on class voting and political behavior these authors 
decided that the best indicator for class analysis is occupation.  Rather than Alford’s simple 
classification, however, occupation is divided into non-dichotomous categories such as 
managers, semi-skilled workers, and professionals.  Defenders of the decline of class hypothesis 
continued to reluctantly incorporate the Alford index along with logistic regressions to further 
their point (Clark 2003, Clark and Lipset 1997).  Stonecash et al. (2000) broke with the tradition 
set by previous scholars by invoking relative household income as the proper indicator of social 
class in America.  This was done because the “relative income situation of voters […] reflects 
the relative level of resources people have to live their lives” (731).  Cited in this approach are 
studies that show that individuals in low-income families have fewer opportunities to attend 
good schools and colleges, have less access to health care, and have fewer prospects for 
retirement savings (738).  Regardless of what collar these individuals wear to work, their income 
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appears to be a proper indicator of how many resources are available to the individual and 
therefore, their relative social class. 
Trends in Class Politics 
Most scholars have concluded that American class politics has been declining since the 
1950s (Inglehart 1971, 1977, Clark and Lipset 1991, Clark, Lipset, and Rempel 1993, Clark 
1996, 2001, Nieuwbeerta 2001, Lipset 2001; see also Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).  Most 
such studies base their findings on the Alford index although some studies have derived similar 
conclusions with a different operationalization of social class.  For example, subjective 
identification as part of a social class has been a part the National Election Studies (NES), for 
decades.  Respondents to the survey usually are asked whether they identify as someone in the 
“working class” or in the “middle class.”  Heinz Eulau (1955, 1955a) pointed out that individuals 
differed in their political behavior based on their self-identified class.  Lipset argued that 
individuals in the working class were more likely to support an authoritarian government – be it 
right (Fascist) or left (Communist) – than were middle class individuals in a variety of countries 
(1959).  This was said to be due to a variety of social and psychological reasons, including that 
working class individuals grew up in more authoritarian homes.  Other studies using these data 
suggest that the middle and working class identifiers have become less stratified over the years in 
terms of political behavior (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1999, Nelson 2005). 
Many studies that provide evidence of a decline in class politics since the 1950s rely on 
objective information which creates class stratification.  As mentioned above, the Alford index 
has been remarkably adept at promoting the declining significance of class hypothesis.  Using 
the Alford index, Clark and Lipset (1991) infamously declared the “death of class” as a 
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stratification system on which people based their political and social decisions.  They provided 
evidence to the effect that some social groups, including and especially social class, are 
fragmenting as hierarchical social stratification in general becomes less and less commonplace 
(Clark and Lipset 1991).  This is a recurring theme in the “decline of class” literature: to fill the 
void left by the declining significance of class, other social cleavages such as race or moral 
values have taken its place (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990: 260 Abramson 1978, Clark, Lipset, and 
Rempel 1993, Clark 2003). 
Ronald Inglehart is widely praised as the originator of the hypothesis of postmaterialism, 
which suggests that “material” or economic interests decline as a nation gains economic and 
physical security (1990).  This, he posits, is due to the fact that most people in such advanced 
societies in effect take living for granted and focus their attention less on bread-and-butter issues 
and more on abstract ones, such as environmentalism and the promotion of free speech.  Thus, 
class interests ought to decline and “values” issues such as those mentioned above should 
become more salient as postmaterialism rises.  Furthermore, as ideology change is rare in 
individual persons, generational change is considered to be the ultimate harbinger of 
postmaterialist change.  Other researchers have found either no change in class politics or 
something termed “trendless fluctuation,” in which class voting moves very little and erratically 
from one election to the next (Goldthorpe 2001).   
Fewer scholars have suggested that class politics has been on the rise since the 1950s 
(Stonecash et al. 2000, Brooks and Brady 1999, Hout, Brooks and Manza 1993, 1997, Weakliem 
1991).  The evidence for this view is also based on an objective view of social class, but rather 
than the Alford index, class is operationalized sometimes as an index based on income, 
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occupation, and education (Guterbock 1980), and other times as just one of those variables 
(Stonecash et al 2000, Brooks and Brady 1999, Brooks and Manza 1993, 1997).  These studies 
argue that individuals behave differently in the political arena whether or not they identify with a 
predetermined class and should be studied based on more objective independent variables.  From 
such an operationalization, strikingly different results come clear. 
Weakliem (1991), for example, determined that despite an increase of importance 
attached to “values” in several Western democracies, social class is as salient a cleavage as ever.  
Pakulski (1993) suggested that the significance of class is not really declining, but the Marxist 
basis of class stratification that persists in studies of class politics is becoming outmoded, thereby 
giving false impressions of a lessening importance of class.  Evans (1993) found that “among 
older people, class interests are rooted more in present class position and possessions” because 
“[i]f you are older, what you have now is of greater importance for your political interests than 
what you might obtain in the future” (272).  Thus, older individuals engage in class politics more 
than younger people due to their limited prospects for upward mobility.  Stonecash, et al. found 
an increase of the difference in percentage voting Democrat between the top third and bottom 
third income earners from the 1950s through the 1990s.  All of this evidence directly opposed 
that of previous research, which held that class had been a declining factor in vote choice and 
partisan identification.  Still others have performed in-depth case studies in specific areas that 
have led to differing conclusions.  Guterbock (1980), for instance, seized an opportunity to 
investigate changes in class voting in “Middletown,” made famous by sociologists Robert and 
Helen Lynd.  By replicating the methods used in the 1930s – including analysis of aggregate data 
– he determined that class voting persisted, at least in 1980, at nearly the same levels. 
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No consensus has emerged concerning the trends of class politics.  The results of any 
analysis rest on how “class” is measured and how substantial an increase or decrease is required 
for the author to make a determination.  One quality required by almost all social scientists 
concerning the measurement of social class is relative access to resources.  The theory of class 
interests requires that those in higher social classes have access to resources that those in the 
lower classes do not.  While occupation may have provided an approximation of access to 
resources in previous decades, both manual and non-manual occupations have similar tiers of 
income that provide stratified access.  The rise of the service sector in America in the past twenty 
years and the substantial decline in manual occupations presents a conundrum of where to place 
rapidly shifting sections of the economy in time-series analyses.  Furthermore, Marxist 
ideologies have never proven to be very popular in the United States, especially not in the slice 
of time this paper is concerned with (1952-2004).  Therefore, neither occupation nor subjective 
identification with a particular class seem appropriate for this analysis. 
A more apposite measure of social class considering the context of the time in American 
politics is relative family income.  Relative income appears to me to be the most approximate 
and consistent indicator of individuals’ access to resources during this time in American history 
for several reasons.  First, it is by nature consistent.  An individual who was in the lower third of 
household income in 1952 has the same relative access to resources as a similar individual in the 
1990s.  A blue-collar worker in the 1950s had decidedly less access to resources than a white-
collar worker, but by the 2000s, a mechanic might make as much as or more than an executive 
assistant, providing more, or at least more equal, access.  Secondly, by separating individuals 
into tiers of income, one can virtually identify how likely that person is to have access to health 
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care, proper education, a sanitary environment, and even quality food or shelter or a working 
automobile or mass transit.  Third, rather than an indicator which is presumed to be a means 
through which resources might be required or expected such as education, income is based solely 
on the resources the individual has at the time the political behavior was noted.  It is not that one 
is objectively better or more important, but which one provides the most access to goods and 
services through a higher income. 
Values 
As briefly discussed above, Ronald Inglehart’s postmaterialism hypothesis points to 
“values” as the leading cause in the supposed decline in class politics.  As part of his original 
work, Inglehart developed a series of survey questions that were designed to ascertain which 
goals respondents from many countries believed should be on the national agenda.  Included 
were “maintain order in the nation,” “give people more say in the decisions of the government,” 
“fight rising prices,” and “protect freedom of speech” (1990: 74).  The first and third of these 
were deemed “materialist” goals; that is, they were concerned with economic and physical 
security.  The second and fourth were “postmaterialist” goals in that they did not concern 
security but were more abstract goals which ought to be desired by those in a more secure 
economic and physical environment in their formative years.  The interviewer would ask which 
of the four goals ought to be highest in priority and then which should be second.  Identifying 
both materialist goals to both questions would identify the respondent as a materialist, both 
postmaterialist answers as a postmaterialist, and one of each as “mixed.”  Later, eight more 
questions were added to the four-item battery including materialist goals such as “strong defense 
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forces” and “fight against crime” as well as postmaterialist goals like “a friendlier, less 
impersonal society” and to “make our cities and countryside more beautiful” (75). 
Inglehart’s decades-long analysis of his postmaterialism hypothesis has led to several 
conclusions.  First, postmaterialism is on the rise.  From the 1970s until the present day, 
postmaterialism has steadily increased in many countries while materialism has fallen (Inglehart 
1990: Chapter 2, Inglehart and Abramson 1999).  Secondly, the changes in these countries’ 
postmaterialist scores are due mainly to generational replacement (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and 
Inglehart 1992).  Younger cohorts are more likely to be postmaterialist than their predecessors in 
almost every country, and period effects are visible and relatively equal in all cohorts.  Third, the 
rise in salience of these values is directly related to the decline in significance of social class as a 
political cleavage.  Inglehart’s long-ranging studies have influenced many social scientists and 
convinced many that postmaterialism is a valid and sensible framework through which we might 
understand recent political trends.  Evidence from decades of work suggests that materialism is 
decreasing while postmaterialism is increasing in most Western democracies.  Noticeably absent 
in most of these studies, however, is analysis of the United States and its voters’ adherence to 
postmaterialist values.  Carmines and Layman (1997) identified this problem and noted that 
Americans have a peculiar relationship to postmaterialism: it is on the rise, but only influences 
voters indirectly, through more traditional issue orientations. 
But there are problems with Inglehart’s analysis.  For example, it relies on a decline in 
class politics as it is something that should happen if economic issues become less salient – an 
assumption at the heart of postmaterialism.  The reality of this assumption, as noted above, has 
come under scrutiny.  Brown and Carmines (1995) found that there was very little difference in 
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how materialists and postmaterialists voted in the presidential elections from 1976 to 1992.  In 
essence, both economic and non-economic issues mattered to both materialists and 
postmaterialists in determining their presidential vote choice.  The validity of the postmaterialist 
index itself has also come under fire.  Davis and Davenport (1999) found that the American 
respondents answers to the goals in the index “approximate a random response in the aggregate” 
and that their “second choices [are] increasingly related only randomly to their first” (662).  
Furthermore, the individual responses to the postmaterialism index failed to properly predict 
other conceivably linked variables (656).  Clarke et al. (1999) noted evidence suggesting that 
Inglehart’s index was actually a measurement artifact.  By controlling for interactions with 
unemployment and inflation concerns, Clarke et al. determined that the supposed value shifts 
that had taken place in Germany and Canada were false: the relationship was spurious.  Inglehart 
attempted to explain away Davis and Davenport’s critiques by simply saying that the 
postmaterialist index was not designed to predict responses to other questions (1999).  While 
Inglehart admitted that there were period effects to the postmaterialist hypothesis, he provided 
evidence that postmaterialism was still a significant variable despite inflation and unemployment 
variation.  Proponents of the persisting salience of class hypothesis have also assaulted 
Inglehart’s postmaterialism methods.  Brooks and Manza (1994), for example, suggested that 
although it is quite probable that values have changed in Western democracies in recent decades, 
the postmaterialism scale is a poor indicator of such change.  Furthermore, they suggest that 
dichotomizing individuals into materialism/postmaterialist terms is similar to the 
counterproductive nature of dichotomizing class into the working/middle class framework.   
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Despite these problems, Inglehart has led the way to the present discussion of values in 
politics.  The fixation of the media on “values” responses to exit polls during the last two 
presidential elections has armed supporters of the values hypothesis with evidence that values are 
important in the minds of Americans – especially considering that Inglehart’s predictions have 
come true concerning the increase of postmaterialists and the decrease in materialists (Carmines 
and Layman 1997).  But it seems as though not everything has worked out the way Inglehart 
imagined.  Inglehart’s version of “values” issues were those concerning the environment or free 
speech; what is inferred from the “values” voters in the 2004 election is values such as anti-
choice, anti-gay, pro-gun, and pro-war: the ironically named “culture of life” agenda.  Thus, as 
Carmines and Layman (1997a) suggested, Inglehart’s measurement scale of postmaterialism is 
invalid in how it measures the United States’ version of “values.”  Moral conservatism, they 
suggest, has a much greater significant influence on political choices – and the evidence they 
provide is very convincing.  In fact, they determined that “[i]n 1992, [moral conservatism] had 
the strongest influence on the probability of voting for George Bush than any variable in the 
model except partisanship,” outstripping even race and family income (764).  Abramowitz 
(1995) provides similar evidence concerning Americans’ attitudes toward abortion, suggesting in 
the title of the article that “It’s Abortion, Stupid.” 
Moral values have been studied at length in the past few years.  Kauffman (2002) offers 
an indication of a gender gap in the culture war: “[t]he defense of traditional lifestyles and the 
rejection of liberal moral values appear to play a more significant role in the political beliefs of 
men than of women” (303).  Several authors have suggested that the culture wars began in the 
1960s with the baby boomer generation and were exacerbated by the Clinton administration 
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(White 2002, Weisberg 2005, Knuckey 2005).  Fiorina’s (2005) new book disagrees with the 
values argument altogether, suggesting that the close recent presidential elections have less to do 
with polarized values and more to do with the outrage of those on the fringes toward the 
increased movement of the parties toward the middle. 
Again, the academic community is split on the relationship between values and political 
behavior.  Inglehart’s postmaterialist hypothesis is compelling to social scientists because it 
explains how values can cross class lines and the supposed decrease in class politics.  But it is 
less compelling in the American case because of both intuition and evidence that point to 
traditional moral values rather than enlightened liberal values as the cause of the value shift.  
Still, such an increase in values could theoretically cross class lines and decrease the salience of 
class or, as Inglehart predicted, temporarily reverse class cleavages.  This thesis will proceed 
with the assumption that both the moral values and postmaterialism hypotheses are valid 
arguments for changes in voter cleavages.  Therefore, both moral conservatism and 
postmaterialist values will be operationalized to determine the length and breadth of the values 







CHAPTER THREE: CLASS 
As discussed in the literature review, the effects of social class on electoral decisions are 
well researched.  Despite an exceptionally large volume of work dedicated to determining these 
effects, a consensus has not been reached among researchers and, so long as class is a divisive 
and salient concept, it is not likely that such a consensus will emerge.  This chapter represents a 
humble exposition on the subject which attempts two things.  The first is to add an element of 
clarity to the debate of whether or not class, as a concept, matters in the political decision-
making process of American individuals.  The second is to raise new questions as to which, if 
any, Americans allow their individual class status to have a bearing on their political decisions. 
There are several ways in which these goals may be met.  In this paper, quantitative 
analyses will be performed as information for the past half-century regarding the income, 
political behavior, and several other potentially meaningful variables are readily available from 
the National Election Studies (NES).  This type of study will allow an empirical determination of 
whether or not individuals in different classes behave differently and the degree at which that 
level is apparent.  A quantitative study is also desirable because it looks beyond the individual 
and can uncover biases that some individuals might prefer to hide. 
Data 
The quantitative data in the chapter covering class, and the next chapter on values, will be 
derived from the NES.  Since 1952, the NES has been performed biannually on a random sample 
of the American population.  Respondents are asked scores of questions concerning their 
personal information such as income level, occupation, age, and religion as well as their 
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particular feelings toward parties, candidates, morality, politics in general, and other topics.  
These biannual surveys are available individually or as a cumulative data file which has data 
from all the years the studies were performed.  Unfortunately, all questions were not asked every 
year, so time series analysis of the data is impossible in some instances. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this and the next chapter will be the same: the party of 
presidential vote choice, the party of House of Representatives vote choice, and the party with 
which the individual identifies.  In an attempt to raise the number of cases available in spite of 
the controls necessary to perform these evaluations, the dependent variables (presidential and 
House elections and partisan identification) will be grouped by decades.  For example, the 
presidential elections of 1972 and 1976 will be combined into elections that took place in the 
1970s.  The goal here is to ascertain trends in the electorate, not to study the characteristics of 
individual elections.  Although some decades have three presidential elections and others only 
two, the numbers in each decade are similar (usually between 2500 and 3000), and the goal of 
studying trends can be most easily discussed in a generic framework of decades.  For the 
presidential vote choice variable, those who voted Democratic are coded as Democratic while 
those who voted for any other candidate (Republicans and third-party candidates such as Perot or 
Wallace) are coded as “not Democratic.”  In House elections, third party candidates are not 
included in the original data set and therefore cannot be used.  Thus, individuals who did not 
vote Republican are Democratic voters.  For the partisan identification variable, the seven-point 
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party ID scale was employed despite its supposed shortcomings1.  Strong Democrats, weak 
Democrats, and independents leaning Democratic were all included as Democratic, as 
independents are often more partisan than weak supporters (Dennis 1992).  “Pure” independents 
and all Republicans were coded as “not Democratic.”  For the regions, I have deferred to Charles 
Bullock’s (1988) definition of six regions2 rather than use the standard four NES regions, though 
the names of the regions have been slightly changed in order to be more precise.  Since the 
elections are to be grouped into decades rather than individual elections, a closer look at more 
specific regions is both possible and warranted. 
Independent Variables 
Class has been an intriguing yet elusive variable for political scientists for some time.  
The NES contains many variables which are related to an individual’s social class.  For example, 
since the inception of the NES, respondents’ occupation, level of education, and relative income 
level have all been reported.  As was covered in the literature review, all of these variables have 
been used extensively to measure the social class of respondents.  It was also noted in the 
                                                 
1 The NES Party ID scale is notorious for not capturing the essence of “independence.”  
In this instance though, independents are grouped in with Republicans as they are not 
Democratic identifiers.  Thus, the scale is more useful for this purpose. 
2 The regions are defined as follows.  Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; 
North Central: IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI; Border South: DC, DE, KY, 
MD, OK, WV; Solid South: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA; Pacific West: 
AK, CA, HI, OR, WA; Mountain West: AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY 
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literature review that in this paper, family income would be used to measure social class.  This is 
done because it is a consistent indicator of relative access to resources.  Those in the lowest 
income bracket have less access to resources than those in the middle, who have less access than 
those in the highest bracket. 
In the NES, income is coded so that those whose family income is in the 0 to 16th 
percentile are in the lowest bracket, then those in the 17th to 33rd percentile, the 34th through 
67th percentile, the 68th through the 95th percentile, and finally the 96th through 100th 
percentile.  In this paper, the variable is recoded into thirds, so that the 0 through 33rd, 34th 
through 67th and 68th through 100th percentiles are represented along a scale from the lowest to 
highest third income level.  Although the income brackets prescribed by the NES do trace 
income from the lowest to highest levels, the recode is necessary for comparison between 
income groups of the same relative size and access to resources.  Other independent variables 
will act as controls in the regression analyses.  These will consist of variables that are known to 
be influential on vote choice and partisan identification.  The age and education of the 
respondent are ordinal variables while dummy variables will control for race (African-Americans 
are coded as 1), and for the sex of the respondent (females are coded as 1). 
Method 
Class and behavior will be analyzed on a national scale first with crosstabulations along 
with statistics for the nominal variables included.  Percentages of individuals in each income 
bracket that voted for or identified with the Democratic party are displayed.  Also, the 
differences in the Democratic vote or identification between low- and high-income brackets and 
low-and middle-income brackets are calculated for comparative purposes.  In dealing with 
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regions, rather than showing the actual percentages of individuals who voted for the Democratic 
party in each income bracket, election, and region, the data will be shown as a difference in 
Democratic affect between two sets of individuals in different income brackets.  For example, 
Table 3.2 displays the percentage of low-income individuals voting for a Democratic president 
minus the percentage of high-income individuals voting for a Democratic president per decade.  
Later, logistic regression analyses will be performed to determine the effect that class has, if any, 
on presidential and congressional election choices, and partisan identification.  The effects of 
class will be controlled for by dividing the nation into separate regions and by utilizing the 
independent variables listed above.  In the case of logistic regressions, all variables have been 
recoded on a scale of 0 to 1, so all of the results are comparable. 
Hypotheses 
The aim of this chapter is to determine how class affects individual voting behavior both 
nationwide and in separate regions of the United States.  Several hypotheses are necessary in 
order to uncover such a relationship.  First it is hypothesized that, in accordance with Stonecash 
et al (2000), those in the lowest income bracket will be more likely to vote and identify as 
Democratic than those in the highest income bracket, with the middle-income bracket falling 
somewhere in between.  Likewise, as the income of individuals rises, individuals will be more 
likely to vote for and identify with Republicans.  The purpose of this hypothesis is to determine 
whether or not the trend identified in Stonecash et al has continued into the 21st century.  
Hypothesis 2 will utilize the time series function of this chapter; it states that the gap in political 
orientation toward the Democratic party between individuals in the highest income bracket and 
individuals in the lowest income bracket will increase over time.   
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The main point of this paper though is to determine variations in voting behavior across 
regions.  Some areas of the United States have a history of class conflict while in others such 
traditional cleavages are notably absent.  For example, the Northeast and North Central regions 
have traditionally been hotbeds of conflict between organized labor and business interests while 
others have remained rather silent on such issues.  It is entirely possible that the conflicts that 
have taken place in the Northeast and North Central regions would continue on to the voting 
booth.  Labor unions regularly support the Democratic party and its candidates, and Americans 
often view the Democratic party as “for the working class” and the Republicans are “for the 
rich.”  Conversely, where organized labor and class struggles have been largely absent, namely 
the southern and western regions, such conflicts might not have entered the political arena.  
These regions have a much more pronounced agricultural and service sector and a much smaller 
industrial one.  It seems plausible that such regions would be less likely to engage in political 
class conflicts.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 states that the degree of separation between higher and lower 
income brackets will be greater in regions where there is a history of class conflict such as the 
Northeast and North Central regions than in areas where such conflicts did not traditionally erupt 
such as all the South and West regions. 
Hypothesis 4 simply deals with the addition of the other independent variables.  While 
the relationship between class and political behavior may be supported by the crosstabulations, it 
might also be spurious.  For example, the difference may be that women are more Democratic 
than men and women make less money than men.  Thus, the difference might show up in a 
crosstabulation, but it would have more to do with the sex of the individual than the income.  
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Hypothesis 4 states that even having controlled for these other variables, class will remain a 
statistically significant predictor of political behavior. 
Results And Discussion 
Voting disparity between individuals in the highest and lowest income brackets grew 
substantially between the 1960s and 1990s.  During the 1950s and 1960s, the difference in 
Democratic presidential voting between the highest and lowest income brackets was only about 
six percent.  The 1970s saw an expansion of class voting, when that figure jumped to 15%, 
followed by another jump in the 1980s and 1990s to about 22%.  A drop in low-income voters 
voting Democratic coupled with an increase in high-income voters voting Democratic caused the 
disparity to drop in the 2000s to slightly below the level of the 1970s: 13.9%.   
The relationship between class and presidential voting appears to be factual, but slight, 
and increasing from the 1950s to the 1990s.  The peak of class voting for the presidency in the 
1990s was accompanied by a Chi-Square statistic of only 80.92 with 2 d.f.  Cramer’s V in the 
same decade was a mere 0.18, ranging from 0.06 to 0.17 in the other decades.  Therefore, there is 
a statistically significant yet weak relationship between income and presidential voting in all 
decades.  According to this initial data on presidential elections, Hypotheses 1 and 2 appear to 
have gained evidence in their favor. 
Voting for the House of Representatives has followed a similar pattern.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, the difference between individuals in high- and low-income brackets voting Democratic 
varied by about eight percent.  Just as in presidential voting patterns, the disparity between high- 
and low-income voters grew from the 1960s to the 1990s from 7.7% to 23.0%, which closed in 
the 2000s to just 14%.  According to the statistics, the significance of the relationship is nearly 
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identical.  Chi-Square statistics are higher in this section of the table, and Cramer’s V depicts a 
relationship ranging from a very weak 0.06 in the 1950s and 1960s to a modest 0.18 in the 
1990s.  There is a weak statistically significant relationship between income and House voting in 
all decades.   
 
Table 3.1: Presidential and House Elections and Party Identification By Income Level and Decade, 1952 
President
  Income Differences Statistics 
  Low Middle High Lo – Hi Lo - Mid χ2 N Cramer's V
1950s 43.4% 43.9% 37.9% 5.5% -0.5% 7.91* 2384 0.06*
1960s 55.5% 55.4% 49.3% 6.2% 0.1% 10.67** 2982 0.06** 
1970s 50.1% 42.8% 35.2% 14.9% 7.3% 41.81*** 2829 0.12*** 
1980s 55.2% 43.3% 33.3% 21.9% 11.9% 98.11*** 3256 0.17*** 
1990s 63.0% 50.3% 40.8% 22.2% 12.7% 80.92*** 2590 0.18*** 
2000s 58.0% 49.8% 44.1% 13.9% 8.2% 22.92*** 1720 0.12*** 
House
  Income Differences Statistics 
  Low Middle High Lo – Hi Lo - Mid χ2 N Cramer's V
1950s 56.5% 58.2% 48.3% 8.2% -1.7% 23.34*** 2870 0.09***
1960s 61.1% 59.3% 53.4% 7.7% 1.8% 18.11*** 3872 0.07*** 
1970s 65.8% 58.7% 51.3% 14.5% 7.1% 64.42*** 4647 0.12*** 
1980s 68.1% 56.6% 50.7% 17.4% 11.5% 81.03*** 4367 0.14*** 
1990s 67.1% 55.4% 44.1% 23.0% 11.7% 147.55*** 4342 0.18*** 
2000s 60.5% 54.0% 46.5% 14.0% 6.5% 19.52** 1417 0.12*** 
Party Identification
  Income Differences Statistics 
  Low Middle High Lo – Hi Lo - Mid χ2 N Cramer's V
1950s 59.3% 58.5% 52.8% 6.5% 0.8% 20.50*** 5695 0.05***
1960s 59.9% 58.3% 52.4% 7.5% 1.6% 27.97*** 6479 0.05*** 
1970s 59.4% 54.7% 46.6% 12.8% 4.7% 105.03*** 9448 0.09*** 
1980s 59.4% 50.7% 43.1% 16.3% 8.7% 144.42*** 8346 0.11*** 
1990s 59.5% 51.2% 42.5% 17.0% 8.3% 161.64*** 8384 0.12*** 
2000s 56.4% 48.8% 45.9% 10.5% 7.6% 21.26*** 2550 0.11*** 
Notes: All rows have 2 degrees of freedom. ***significant at the .001 level **significant at the .01 level 
*significant at the .05 level 





Partisan identification is said to be much more stable than voting patterns.  Individuals 
that identify with one party often remain loyal to that party (as far as identification) for their 
entire lives, despite splitting their ticket for a candidate of another party, or even switching 
parties altogether.  Thus it is not surprising to find that the gap seen in voting behavior is more 
muted when observing party identification.  As can be seen in the bottom section of Table 3.1, 
there has been an income gap in party identification as far back as the 1950s.  This gap, like 
presidential and House voting, was small: 6.5%.  In the 1960s it was only 7.5%.  Just as in the 
other two measures, the gap widened in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, but only to a peak of 17%.  
In the 2000s, the gap shrank to 10.5%.  This muted growth is also notable in the statistical 
evidence.  The relationship between income and partisan identification is even less strong than in 
the other two, with Cramer’s V ranging from 0.05 to only 0.12. 
Perhaps the most important fact to take from this analysis is that there is indeed a 
moderate, statistically significant relationship between class and voting and between class and 
partisan identification.  This relationship has, contrary to popular belief, been gaining in strength 
in the previous half-century and apparently peaked in the 1990s.  But despite the recent drop-off 
in class voting and identification in this decade, the relationship has not completely disintegrated.  
With Cramer’s V statistics of .11 and .12, there remains a statistically significant relationship 
between income (i.e. access to resources) and political behavior.  Thus Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
supported by the data: there is a relationship and it has grown since the 1950s, although there is a 
lapse in recent elections. 
Also of interest in Table 3.1 is a growth in the gap between middle- and low-income 
voters.  By the 1970s, the gap between middle- and low-income voters approximated the gap 
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between high- and low-income voters of the 1960s.  By the 1980s, the middle-low gap exceeded 
the 1960s high-low gap in all three variables.  In the 2000s, the middle-low gap has subsided to a 
level just higher than that of the 1970s.  This gap is crucial to understanding the peculiarities of 
American class politics.  Previously, middle- and low-income voters acted as a bloc, resulting in 
an outcome which was more to the liking of the lower income earners.  From the 1970s to the 
1990s, however, middle-income earners split from lower income earners and more closely 
approximated the voting and identification patterns of the highest income earners.  This has 
almost certainly played a role in the diminishing number of Democratic victories in the House 
and presidency. 
Having provided initial evidence supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hypothesis 3 must now 
be addressed.  Hypothesis 3 addresses the idea that class voting is more likely to occur in regions 
of the country in which there is a history of class conflict such as the Northeast and North 
Central regions while the South and West regions ought to exhibit less class voting.  Table 3.2 
displays the differences in class voting for president in the six regions mentioned in the Data and 
Methods section.  Several patterns become apparent from these data.  For example, every region 
except the Border South and the Mountain West has exhibited an increase in high- and low-
income voting disparity between the 1950s and 2000s.  In the Solid South, it nearly doubled from 
12.8% to 24.8% while the North Central region saw in increase of over 14%.  The Northeast and 
Pacific West saw much more modest increases at just 5.7% and 1.2% respectively. 
The second pattern apparent in Table 3.2 is that all of the regions followed the national 
trend shown in Table 3.1, but at different degrees.  For instance, the high-low income disparity 
for presidential elections rose in every region between the 1950s and 1990s and fell in every 
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region between the 1990s and 2000s.  In every region the greatest increases were between the 
1960s and 1980s and most regions (the most notable exception being the Border South) enjoyed 
a relative plateau between the 1980s and 1990s before falling in the 2000s. 
 
Table 3.2: Low-High Difference in Democratic Presidential Vote By Region, 
Income Level, and Decade, 1952 – 2004 
  Northeast North Central Border South 
1950s 3.7% 1.2% 0.0% 
1960s 8.7% 0.2% 0.0% 
1970s 6.8% 16.2% 0.0% 
1980s 14.1% 14.9% 10.9% 
1990s 12.6% 18.5% 19.5% 
2000s 9.4% 14.9% 0.0% 
  Solid South Pacific West Mountain West 
1950s 12.8% 10.6% 0.0% 
1960s 14.6% 9.7% 5.4% 
1970s 22.0% 14.4% 31.0% 
1980s 37.1% 21.5% 18.5% 
1990s 33.2% 16.3% 22.2% 
2000s 24.8% 11.8% 0.0% 
Note: If percentages are less than or equal to zero, they are identified as 0.0%. 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
But there are important differences between the regions.  Different regions have exhibited 
peaks in class voting at different times.  For example, the Mountain West region’s measure rose 
at an extraordinary rate in the 1970s and fell rapidly in the next decade.  The North Central 
region’s number rose from 0.2% in the 1960s to 16.2% in the 1970s and has remained within a 
few percentage points since then.  In the 1980s, it was the Solid South’s turn to rapidly increase 
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the prevalence of class voting to a whopping 37.1%.  The Border South displayed a propensity 
for class voting in the 1980s and 1990s when an enormous gap appeared and then vanished in the 
2000s.   
 
Table 3.3: Low-High Differences in Democratic House Vote and Party ID By Region, Income 
Level, and Decade, 1952 – 2004 
  Northeast North Central Border South 
 House PID House PID House PID 
1950s 8.7% 7.6% 3.2% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
1960s 8.2% 5.9% 1.7% 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
1970s 10.2% 11.2% 9.3% 8.0% 6.5% 1.2% 
1980s 13.0% 18.1% 8.9% 14.4% 0.5% 4.6% 
1990s 8.5% 10.0% 21.5% 13.0% 35.8% 13.3% 
2000s 16.4% 3.8% 12.7% 14.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Solid South Pacific West Mountain West 
 House PID House PID House PID 
1950s 0.0% 0.0% 16.5% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
1960s 6.7% 9.2% 5.4% 8.9% 18.7% 13.2% 
1970s 13.9% 13.2% 15.9% 18.9% 10.7% 12.2% 
1980s 26.2% 17.1% 19.8% 16.5% 20.3% 16.4% 
1990s 34.5% 22.6% 20.9% 21.8% 21.6% 16.9% 
2000s 23.6% 22.0% 15.7% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Note: If percentages are less than or equal to zero, they are identified as 0.0%. 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
Another difference is in the strength of each region’s class voting.  Here, Hypothesis 3 
can be discussed.  In the section above, I suggested that the Northeast and North Central regions 
would be most likely to exhibit signs of class voting.  The data suggest that this is not the case.  
In every decade except the 1970s, the eleven states of the old Confederacy show the strongest 
tendency toward class voting.  For the past thirty years, the presidential gap in the Solid South 
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has been at least 10% higher than in any other region.  The Mountain West region showed more 
class voting than most other regions from the 1970s through the 1990s, and then the gap simply 
disappeared.  Border South states had very little class voting through the years and the Pacific 
West region is hardly a hotbed of class-based presidential voting.  However, it is true that the 
Northeast and North Central regions have some of the lowest rates of class voting.  The highest 
class voting gap in the Northeast was just 14.1% in the 1980s and in the North Central it was just 
18.5% in the 1990s compared to the Solid South’s whopping 37.1% in the 1980s.  The regions 
are also more diverse today in their class voting propensities than they were at mid-century.  In 
the 1950s and 1960s, the regions with the highest and lowest class voting rates were only about 
15% apart.  So far in the 2000s, the regions range from the Border South and Mountain West at 
0% to the Solid South at 25%. 
Regional class voting for the House took on a similar pattern, though there are a few 
differences.  The Solid South started at a much lower level in House voting and peaked in the 
1990s rather than the 1980s.  It did have the highest levels of class voting from the 1980s 
through the 2000s, just as in presidential voting.  Also as in presidential voting, all regions 
displayed an increase in class voting at the House level between the 1950s and 1990s with the 
exception of the Northeast region, due to a drop between the 1980s and 1990s.  The Northeast 
was also the exception in that it was the only region that did not see a decline in class voting at 
the House level in the 2000s.  The same patterns generally hold true for partisan identification as 
well, although the increases and decreases are again at a more subdued level than in the other 
two measures.  All regions saw an increase in class-based identification patterns between the 
1950s and 1990s and they all decreased in the 2000s (except the North Central region which had 
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a slight increase).  Also absent from this measure is the dwarfing of the class politics of other 
regions by the Solid South.  That particular region was much closer to the other regions 
compared to presidential and House voting.  
Three inferences can be gleaned from the preceding information.  The first is that there is 
evidence that an increase in class voting on a national scale has occurred between the 1950s and 
the present.  Although it is certainly not what one might call a “class war” taking place at the 
ballot box, there is certainly a difference in voting patterns based on the amount of income 
coming into the home.  Whether the relationship is spurious, or is evident only in certain groups 
of people remains to be seen.  Second, there is now a difference between low- and middle- 
income individuals that has hardly existed at all before the 1970s.  This can help explain the 
Republican rise in recent decades.  As middle-income individuals exit the Democratic party 
along with their upper-income counterparts, it is not surprising that the Republicans now control 
the two elected branches of national government.  The third is that although some aspects of the 
pattern of class voting are similar between regions, there are indeed differences.  Inconsistent 
with the third hypothesis, the Solid South appears to have a history of class politics that far 
surpasses any other region in terms of presidential elections and, in more recent years, House 
elections and partisan identification.  Conversely, the Northeast, North Central, and Border South 
(except in 1990) have some of the lowest levels of class voting.  With the exception of 
presidential elections in some decades, the Mountain West and Pacific West have generally 
followed the same patterns as the nation, usually falling in between the more extreme regions.  In 




Having discovered a significant link between class and political behavior, a more in-
depth approach to understanding that relationship is appropriate.  As discussed in the Data and 
Methods section, logistic regressions were performed on presidential and House voting and 
partisan identification both nationwide and in each region, in each decade.  The results of these 
regressions are expressed in Table 3.4 below.  
What is apparent in the regressions from the nationwide sample is that even when 
controlling for other factors such as race, gender, and education, income has become a greater 
predictor of political behavior since the 1950s, directly supporting Hypothesis 4.  During the 
1990s, individuals in the lowest income bracket were close to twice as likely to vote for a 
Democratic president and congressperson than those in the highest income bracket and 
individuals in the middle-income bracket were about 1.4 times as likely to vote Democratic than 
their more wealthy counterparts.  These statistically significant results stand in contrast to the 
1950s and 1960s in which there was no real difference between any of the three income groups.  
Even as the gender gap was growing in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, income remained a salient 
indicator of how individuals would act politically.  In fact, from the 1970s through the 1990s, 
class had the greatest effect on individual political behavior except for race. 
Another important factor to consider from Table 3.4 is that class as a predictor of political 
behavior dropped off steeply in the 2000s, just as in the crosstabulations.  In no case was the 
middle-income group significantly different from the upper-income (constant) group in the 
2000s.  Lower-income individuals were much less different from upper- and middle-income 
individuals during the 2000s compared to the three earlier decades.  In short, it appears as though 
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class has, in the span of the past fifty years, become a stronger and then weaker political 
cleavage. 
 
Table 3.4: Class on Presidential Vote, House Vote, and Party ID by Decade, 1952-2004 
President
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Lower Income 0.06 -0.04 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.42**
Middle Income 0.07 0.05 0.23* 0.34*** 0.32** 0.13
Age -0.69*** -0.86*** -0.66*** 0.05 0.15 0.30
Black 1.23*** 2.57*** 2.60*** 2.49*** 2.67*** 2.39***
Female -0.17* -0.01 0.09 0.18* 0.33*** 0.44***
Education -0.88*** 1.17*** -0.23 -0.27* -0.18 0.39
Nagelkerke R2 0.047 0.117 0.137 0.159 0.160 0.150
Cox and Snell R2 0.035 0.087 0.101 0.118 0.120 0.112
House
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Lower Income 0.28** 0.10 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.70*** 0.47**
Middle Income 0.27** 0.09 0.26*** 0.15* 0.36*** 0.21
Age -0.73*** -0.61*** -0.44*** -0.24* -0.15 -0.04
Black 1.56*** 1.90*** 2.12*** 2.03*** 1.65*** 2.97***
Female -0.19* -0.19** -0.13* -0.06 0.11 0.28*
Education -0.55*** -1.04*** -0.34** -0.32** -0.51*** 0.32
Nagelkerke R2 0.046 0.080 0.074 0.096 0.104 0.158
Cox and Snell R2 0.035 0.059 0.055 0.071 0.078 0.118
Party Identification
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Lower Income 0.17* 0.04 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.23*
Middle Income 0.11 0.08 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.03
Age -0.83*** -0.55*** -0.09 0.39*** 0.32*** 0.24
Black 0.51*** 1.27*** 1.43*** 1.65*** 1.49*** 1.74***
Female -0.62** -0.05 0.05 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.33***
Education -0.15*** -0.97*** -0.52*** -0.15 -0.22** 0.03
Nagelkerke R2 0.031 0.059 0.065 0.097 0.092 0.107
Cox and Snell R2 0.023 0.044 0.048 0.073 0.069 0.080
Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. *** significant at .001 level 
** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level 




Much of the literature to date has been written either explicitly or implicitly in the context 
of realignment.  Proponents of class as an indicator of political behavior have suggested that 
class has remained as significant as in previous decades or has become more so.  Advocates of 
postmaterialism and a new morality hypothesis suggest that class has become much less 
important as individuals are now more concerned with social issues such as homosexuality, 
abortion, or freedom of speech.  The results of this chapter on class lead to conclusions that can 
be spun into either of these camps.  While most were suggesting that class politics were 
declining, this analysis indicates the exact opposite.  There was little or no class-based politics in 
the 1950s followed by a profound increase through the 1990s.  Only recently has this increase 
been dampened.  While some may still say that class politics is dead, the evidence suggests that 
class is still a statistically significant indicator of political behavior.  What the results clearly 
show, though, is that a realignment has simply not occurred. 
Referring back to the literature review, the basic components of a realignment are that 
there is a clear and durable shift amongst the electorate.  While there was a shift between 1952 
and 1996, the drop in class politics in the 2000s simply precludes any suggestion that a 
realignment has occurred.  While the drop may be short and inconsequential in the long term, 
there is no evidence from these results of a durable realignment in the patterns of the voting 
public.  Furthermore, a realignment suggests that individuals were once aligned in one way and 
then aligned in the opposite way.  An example of this is the once persistently Democratic south 
which has become persistently Republican in recent years.  From the data analysis presented 





Table 3.5: Class on Presidential Vote by Decade and Region, 1952-2004 
    Northeast North Central Border South
Low Income 0.02 -0.23 0.781950s Middle Income 0.08 0.02 0.40
Low Income 0.16 -0.17 -0.781960s Middle Income 0.04 0.05 -0.53
Low Income 0.45 0.79*** -0.051970s Middle Income -0.15 0.55** -0.26
Low Income 0.10 0.25 0.451980s Middle Income 0.35 0.26 0.26
Low Income 0.39 0.49* -0.301990s Middle Income -0.01 0.46* -0.10
Low Income 0.11 0.41 0.832000s Middle Income -0.02 0.45 0.88
    Solid South Pacific West Mountain West
Low Income 0.35 0.26 -1.201950s Middle Income 0.07 0.45 -1.74*
Low Income 0.19 0.17 0.111960s Middle Income 0.29 0.43 -0.51
Low Income 0.26 0.53 1.57*1970s Middle Income 0.17 0.57* 0.84
Low Income 1.05*** 0.73** 0.751980s Middle Income 0.58** 0.36 0.10
Low Income 0.93*** 0.48 1.00*1990s Middle Income 0.47* 0.43 0.24
Low Income 0.89** 0.49 0.072000s Middle Income 0.21 -0.20 -0.44
Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. *** significant at .001 level 
** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset
 
 
Regressions on regional presidential voting revealed that the Solid South region did 
indeed have a much greater proclivity to vote according to class lines than any other region, with 
the North Central falling far behind.  In the 1980s, individuals in low-income southern families 
were nearly three times as likely to vote Democratic as individuals in high-income southern 
families, even after controlling for race, gender, and age.  The trend has continued relatively 
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unabated into the twenty-first century.  Members of low-income southern families are 2.4 times 
more likely to vote Democratic than their high-income counterparts.  This is the exact opposite 
of what one would expect to find, given that poorer southerners are considered most likely to 
vote according to their evangelical values instead of their class status.  What has changed is that 
people in middle-income families have shifted their support.  From a statistically significant 
score of 0.58 to an insignificant 0.23, the middle class has gone from much more Democratic 
than the upper class to about the same level. 
Contrasted with the Solid South region, the rest of the country is virtually free of class 
voting.  As noted above, the North Central region had a much lower prevalence of presidential 
class voting.  The 1970s and 1990s revealed differences between the upper, middle, and lower 
class families while in the rest of the time studied, presidential class voting was absent.  
Individuals in lower-income families in the Mountain West were more likely to vote Democratic 
than those in upper-income families in the 1970s and 1990s also, but the significance is not 
nearly as strong, and middle-income earners were not any different from upper-income earners.  
Neither the Northeast nor the Border South evidenced statistically significant results from the 
regression analyses while the Pacific West had barely significant results for low-income earners 
in the 1980s and middle-income earners in the 1970s.  In short, the rest of the country has hardly 
any presidential class voting whatsoever compared to the Solid South region. 
Results from the regressions on House voting suggest that the Solid South region does 
not hold a monopoly on class voting across the board.  Low-income individuals in the Pacific 
West in the 1970s and 2000s and the Mountain West in the 1990s were more likely to vote for 
Democratic House members than were low-income individuals in the Solid South.  The results 
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for the Party ID analysis are even more level.  Individuals in the Pacific West and even the 
Northeast showed a greater propensity to identify with Democrats than did those in the Solid 
South during the 1980s while the Pacific and Mountain West regions showed a greater Party ID 
disparity in the 1990s. 
 
Table 3.6: Class on House Vote and Party ID by Decade and Region, 1952-2004 
    Northeast North Central Border South 
 Income House Party ID House Party ID House Party ID 
Low 0.22 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.56 1950s Middle 0.12 0.06 0.34* -0.04 0.15 0.22 
Low 0.27 0.03 -0.22 0.00 -0.29 -0.59* 1960s Middle 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.46 -0.07 
Low 0.45* 0.32** 0.39* 0.09 0.14 -0.07 1970s Middle 0.16 0.17 0.24 0.11 0.03 0.13 
Low 0.44* 0.56*** 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.23 1980s Middle -0.03 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.15 -0.25 
Low 0.09 0.33* 0.67*** 0.24* 0.64 -0.35 1990s Middle 0.02 0.20 0.38** 0.17 1.13* -0.21 
Low 0.55 0.07 0.46 0.42 1.18 0.36 2000s Middle 0.23 0.06 0.77*** 0.46* -0.18 0.58 
    Solid South Pacific West Mountain West 
 Income House Party ID House Party ID House Party ID 
Low -0.30 -0.18 0.75* 0.12 -0.34 -0.19 1950s Middle 0.60 0.25 0.39 -0.13 -1.28* -0.58 
Low 0.16 0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.65 -0.03 1960s Middle 0.15 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.11 -0.36 
Low 0.38 0.09 0.61** 0.61*** 0.35 0.20 1970s Middle 0.05 0.20 0.49* 0.38** 0.54 0.31 
Low 0.89*** 0.28* 0.82*** 0.55*** 0.81* 0.58* 1980s Middle 0.39* 0.35** 0.30 0.30* -0.17 0.54* 
Low 1.01*** 0.61*** 0.89*** 0.76*** 0.98** 0.85** 1990s Middle 0.47** 0.46*** 0.61** 0.41** 0.20 0.58** 
Low 0.72* 0.58** 0.80* 0.00 -0.28 -0.07 2000s Middle 0.10 0.18 -0.07 -0.60* -1.20 -0.86 
Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. *** significant at .001 level 
** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level 




The results for this chapter are clear, but unexpected.  The twenty-first century has indeed 
brought about a change in the way Americans behave politically, but that change is a disruption 
of the previous pattern of increasing class disparity at the voting booth.  Low-income Americans 
now differ with upper-income Americans at about the same rate as in the 1970s.  But class 
conflicts do still exist and have the potential to reach greater proportions with little notice as is 
evidenced from the statistics from the 1980s and 1990s.  Even more unexpected is that the Solid 
South, a region that is not known for its labor disputes and class conflicts exhibits the most class-
based voting patterns as anywhere else in the country.  This conflicts with the view that poorer 
southerners have become more values-conscious at the expense of class-consciousness.  What 
remains to be seen is whether or not “values” – either postmaterialist or traditional – matter to 
Americans more than class. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: VALUES 
Perhaps the most talked-about division among Americans in this decade is the so-called 
values divide.  Authors from religious, ethical, and academic backgrounds have all taken up the 
debate on the importance of individual values to the American voter.  Radio talk shows, cable 
news roundtables, and blogs endlessly discuss the necessity for politicians to understand the 
values of American citizens.  Televangelists chastise political elites on the air for their failure to 
accommodate fundamentalist ideals in crafting or enforcing laws, sometimes even calling for 
imprisonment or assassinations. 
Such discussions cannot be employed as evidence that a values divide exists.  Political 
elites and media pundits may argue about the values of the American people at the same time 
that those values have no measurable effect on individual political behavior.  Do values really 
matter to Americans when they decide the political fate of the country?  Over which values are 
we divided?  If values have such an enormous effect, why do they seem so ambiguous?  This 
chapter will discuss which values Americans seem to be divided over and whether or not those 
values have a significant effect on individual political behavior. 
Ronald Inglehart’s hypothesis of the materialist-postmaterialist continuum has led many 
scholars to declare the end of class as a component in understanding electoral behavior.  It is said 
that as materialists leave the electoral arena, the younger postmaterialists take their place, 
making class an obsolete indicator of electoral choice.  Much of the research that tests Inglehart’s 
hypothesis has been cross-national and even then, most do not even include the United States.  
The discussion of postmaterialism in this chapter seeks to shed new light on how the materialist-
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postmaterialist continuum relates to the American electorate and to determine whether or not it is 
more important than class as a predictor of electoral behavior. 
In 2004, an overwhelming 77% of American adults said that religion was an important 
part of their lives.  A full 59% said that religion provided “quite a bit” or “a great deal” of 
guidance in their day-to-day lives.  Thirty-two percent even supported group or school-wide 
prayer in public schools.  24% of Americans attend religious services at least once a week while 
one in three skip out altogether and 80% of Americans describe themselves as Christians.  
Certainly, the values that religious leaders prescribe to individuals influence the values held by 
that individual.  An overwhelming majority of American citizens are religious Christians whose 
beliefs help dictate how they live their lives every day.  It is not difficult to imagine that the 
religious values that dictate personal behavior to these individuals might also dictate their 
political behavior as well.  
It is also apparent that religious and moral values are a major influence on political 
action.  Religious language emanating from political figures, especially those on the right, is 
intertwined with desired policy outcomes such as banning the right of women to choose how, 
when, and with whom to have children, or outlawing the marriage of two men or women.  One 
can hardly engage in a conversation about such issues without delving into the morality of 
individuals who terminate their pregnancies or love someone of the same sex and how these are 
condemned by the Christian Bible.  Of course, this is nothing new.  Language used to argue for 
(and against) civil rights also employed loaded religious language.  Political leaders from 
Thomas Jefferson to Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt have referred to religious ideals 
and morals through the course of American history.  The goal of this part of the chapter is not to 
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discuss the issue of religion in politics, but to determine whether or not religion and moral values 
affect the politics of the American public, what that effect is, whether or not it has grown or 
faded, and how it relates to class politics. 
Data 
With less scholarly evidence and with far fewer data than class, values have the potential 
to explain many changes in American electoral decision-making in the past half-century.  
Submitted in this chapter are two ways to understand the effect values have on political behavior: 
postmaterialist and moral values. 
Postmaterialism 
This chapter uses the same cumulative NES dataset as does the chapter on class, but the 
variables used are not nearly as available or intuitive.  Whereas data on respondents’ relative 
income levels are available from every NES survey, there are no such data available that match 
Inglehart’s survey questions.  In fact, the actual four-question battery developed by Inglehart was 
asked by the NES beginning in 1972 and ending in 1992.  This leaves the most recent twelve 
years of NES surveys without a proper measure for materialism/postmaterialism.  Therefore, in 
order to proceed with this analysis, an alternative battery of questions must be developed.  These 
questions must deal with the theory behind the materialist/postmaterialist paradigm and 
approximate the level of materialism/postmaterialism exhibited by an individual respondent. 
Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism centered on the idea of two dichotomous groups of 
individuals and a mixed group in between.  On one side are the materialists, who are more 
concerned with the government’s responsibility to keep the people safe from economic hardship 
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and physical harm.  Thus, materialists believe that the first priorities of the government should be 
to “fight rising prices” and “maintain order in the nation.”  Conversely, postmaterialists are said 
to have come of age in relative peace and prosperity and to be more concerned with “protect[ing] 
freedom of speech” and “giv[ing] people more say in the decisions of the government.”  “Mixed” 
individuals (i.e. those who feel both materialist and postmaterialist goals should be sought) make 
up the bulk of the population. 
Inglehart claims that materialism rises as economic and physical security declines. 
Therefore, a set of NES questions must tap both the relative economic and physical security that 
a respondent feels, and the political consequences of that security.  One question the NES has 
routinely asked is whether or not the respondent has been laid off in the past 6 months.  
Respondents who are coded as having been laid off are included here, even if they have since 
obtained a job or been rehired.  Even if the respondent has obtained a job since being laid off, the 
economic security of the respondent has recently been shaken.  Such an individual would be less 
likely to take their job for granted, and would be more concerned about losing that job in the 
future or of not getting one quickly.  Another question ties economic security directly to politics: 
a scale where the respondent indicates whether individuals or the government should have more 
responsibility in seeing to it that everyone has access to a job and a “good standard of living.”  
Yet another question is used to determine the respondents’ work status; that is, whether or not 
that person is working, and if not, whether that person is retired, a student, a homemaker, laid 
off, unemployed, or disabled.  One might reasonably expect those in the “working” category to 
have more economic security than those in any other group.  Thus this variable is dichotomized 
into groups of working and not working individuals.  All of these variables are included in order 
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to ascertain the economic security of individual respondents.  Unfortunately, there are far fewer 
variables concerning physical security.  This chapter will utilize the defense spending scale, 
which asks respondents whether defense spending should be greatly increased, greatly decreased 
or at five points in between.  Those who wish for an increase in defense spending can be 
assumed to feel less secure.  Again, these are intended to ascertain the security that an individual 
feels.  Inglehart’s hypothesis predicts that each of these materialist values ought to influence 
individuals to vote for conservative parties. 
Postmaterialism is a much more difficult concept to operationalize.  A postmaterialist 
goal could be described as a non-materialist goal.  That is, anything a respondent believes the 
government should do that is not security-based is a postmaterialist goal.  A cleaner environment 
could be considered a postmaterialist goal, as could a desire for less corruption in government.  
Inglehart introduced several postmaterialist values that I have attempted to approximate here.  
The first is a “thermometer” type scale for environmentalists.  A more appropriate measure 
would be a scale for spending on the environment, just like the one for defense spending.  
Unfortunately, this question was not asked at several points within the time frame being studied 
and could not be used.  The second is a three-point scale asking whether school spending should 
be increased, decreased, or kept the same.  Third is how strongly the respondent disagrees with 
the statement that “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people 
are.”  Although these are not perfect measures, if Inglehart’s hypothesis is correct, they should be 





Moral values will be measured here using data from the same NES dataset as 
postmaterialism and class.  Variables in this section suffer the same problem as materialism and 
postmaterialism in that they are asked less often than researchers might wish.  The most relevant 
moral values variables were included in the 1980s, probably because no one thought such values 
mattered much in politics until that point.  To determine what religion the individual belongs to, 
the major religious group of the respondent (e.g. evangelical or mainline Protestant, Catholic, or 
Jewish) will be employed.  The NES stopped defining these types of groups, specifically 
evangelical Protestants, in 1998.  Fortunately, other researchers have assembled a list of which 
particular religions are “evangelical” and which are “mainline” Protestant (see Bolce and De 
Maio 1999).  This list was used to create a seamless variable which denotes evangelical and 
mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, other, and none up to the most recent survey year3.  
Religiosity will be measured by how often the individual attends religious services and whether 
or not religion has a significant influence in their daily lives.  The assumption here is that if 
religion is a regular part of an individual’s life, it will be more likely to have an effect on that 
individual’s politics.  The remaining variables reserved for this section have to do with the 
respondents’ attitudes toward general and specific moral issues. 
A “moral values” index was created for this analysis by combining four moral and 
traditional values variables.  The first of these questions asks whether more emphasis should be 
                                                 
3 Other religions and none are not included due to the fact that there were too few cases.  
Mainline Protestantism is represented in the constant. 
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placed on traditional values.  Another question asks whether it is appropriate to adjust one’s view 
of morality in light of new situations, essentially measuring moral relativism.  A third asks 
whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement “The newer lifestyles are 
contributing to the breakdown of our society.”  This question requires the respondent to agree to 
two propositions: 1) there is a breakdown in our society and 2) this breakdown is due to the 
“newer lifestyles” of others.  Essentially this question measures both moral certitude and a 
feeling of moral superiority.  The fourth question in the index asks whether “we should be more 
tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are 
different from our own.”  What this index is intended to measure then, is moral conservatism.  
This index taps how strongly one feels about imposing one’s morality on others and whether 
those morals ought to be conservative “traditional” morals or not.  Each variable was recoded to 
give a higher score for more conservative answers and was then consolidated into an index 
measuring from 0 to 1.  Finally, the abortion question – “when should abortions be allowed by 
law?” -- is also added due to the fact that abortion is perhaps the most salient and divisive 
cultural issue in modern times, and has had a significant influence on individual political 
behavior (Abramowitz 1995).  All of the variables in this section have been recoded on a 0 to 1 
scale in which 0 is the least conservative response and 1 is the most conservative response.  For 
example, a 0 on the abortion variable implies that the respondent believes abortion should always 





As in the previous chapter, logistical regressions will be performed to determine the 
influence of each of these variables on Democratic presidential vote, House vote, and partisan 
identification.  Also as in the chapter on class, all of the variables will be coded from 0 to 1 in 
order to standardize the results, making them comparable to each other.  Included in all of the 
regressions will be controls for age, race, gender, and education – four variables known to be 
linked to vote choice and party identification.  What is different in this chapter is the addition of 
ideology as an independent variable, which is used as control.  Not only is the seven-point 
ideology scale from conservative to liberal asked at every point in this time series, but it is much 
more likely to influence how individuals will react to questions such as whether jobs ought to be 
guaranteed by the government or affect toward environmentalists.  Using ideology as a control in 
this instance will allow for more accurate results. 
Hypotheses 
I have set out to achieve three goals in this chapter.  The first is to determine whether or 
not postmaterialism and/or moral values affect individual voting behavior in America.  The 
second is to establish whether or not this influence has been growing or waning over the past 
twenty years.  The third is to uncover how these relationships vary across the regions of the 
country.  To achieve these goals, several hypotheses are necessary. 
The first goal mentioned seeks to uncover whether or not there is a relationship at all 
between the postmaterialism and moral values and political behavior in the United States.  The 
postmaterialist hypothesis claims that materialists are more conservative in nature, being 
 51
 
concerned with older bread-and-butter and security issues while postmaterialists lean toward the 
left (1990).  Therefore, individuals exhibiting materialist tendencies ought to be less likely to 
vote for and identify with parties on the left than postmaterialists.  Hypothesis 1, then, is that 
postmaterialist values will generate positive affect toward the Democratic party while materialist 
values will produce negative affect toward the Democratic party.  Both intuition and previous 
research suggest that moral conservatism ought to be negatively correlated with Democratic 
affect.  Hypothesis 2 states that individuals scoring higher on the moral values variables will be 
less likely to vote for and identify with the Democratic party than those scoring lower on the 
moral values variables. 
The second goal deals with the degree of influence postmaterialism and moral values 
have had on American politics over the course of two decades.  Inglehart’s postmaterialism 
hypothesis requires that postmaterialism should be gaining influence on the political behavior of 
individuals at the expense of materialism.  Hypothesis 3 tests this hypothesis, claiming that over 
time, postmaterialism will become a more significant indicator of Democratic affect while 
materialism becomes less significant.  To determine whether moral values have an increasing 
influence on political behavior, Hypothesis 4 states that over time moral values will become a 
greater predictor of individual affect toward the Democratic party.   
The third goal inquires whether there is a difference in the influence of postmaterialist 
and moral values across regions of the United States.  Just as class relations have traditionally 
had special significance in certain regions of the United States, so too have attitudes toward 
values.  Two regions stand out as the most probable to have incorporated postmaterialist values: 
the Northeast and Pacific West.  It is plausible that those in the Pacific West and Northeast, 
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being more progressive on such postmaterialist goals such as the environment, will be more 
likely than those in other regions to incorporate postmaterialist values.  Thus, Hypothesis 5 states 
that individuals in the Northeast and Pacific West will be more likely to be influenced by 
postmaterialist values than those in other regions.  The Solid South and North Central regions are 
known for their conservative stances on cultural values issues such as abortion.  It seems 
appropriate, then, that Hypothesis 6 state that in comparing individuals, those who reside in the 
South and North Central United States will be more likely to be influenced by moral values 
issues than will those who live in other regions. 
Postmaterialism Results and Discussion 
What is immediately striking about Model A in Table 4.1 is that the results are all over 
the map.  The physical security variable, defense spending, is in the direction the postmaterialist 
hypothesis would anticipate, although there was a considerable lessening of the score in the 
1990s.  In all three decades, the measure was significant and negative, meaning that those 
wishing for an increase in defense spending were less likely to support a Democratic president.  
When the economic security variables are entered there is either no significant difference or, in 
the case the jobs variable, an overwhelming partiality toward the Democratic presidential 
candidates in all three decades.  Those who agree that it is the government’s responsibility to 
ensure employment are nearly 22 times as likely to vote for a Democratic presidential candidate 
than those who disagree.  This is not consistent with Inglehart’s postmaterialism hypothesis, 
which states that materialists lean more toward candidates on the right.  So far as presidential 
contests are concerned, the materialism portion of Inglehart’s hypothesis seems half-correct: the 
desire for physical security definitely affects the vote choice of American individuals toward the 
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right but economic security issues lead respondents toward the left.  Even in the case of a recent 
lob loss or of no job at all, respondents’ lack of economic security does not compel them to vote 
for Republican candidates.  Furthermore, the physical security portion of the materialist variables 
does not seem to be weakening, something postmaterialism suggests ought to happen.   
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Table 4.1: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on Presidential Vote Choice 
Nationwide, 1980s-2000s 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 
Model A   
Defense -3.03*** -0.81* -2.29*** 
Laid off 0.39 -0.15 0.12 
Jobs 1.77*** 1.21*** 2.39*** 
Not Working -0.20 -.632 0.61 
Cox and Snell R2 0.352 0.362 0.437 
Nagelkerke R2 0.476 0.484 0.583 
    
Model B   
Environmentalists 0.76 1.27*** 1.96*** 
Worry about equality? 0.65* 1.01*** 0.36 
School spending 1.21*** 0.89*** 0.85* 
Cox and Snell R2 0.304 0.322 0.383 
Nagelkerke R2 0.407 0.430 0.511 
    
Model C   
Defense -2.77*** -0.68* -2.50*** 
Laid off 0.18 -0.15 0.18 
Jobs 1.17** 0.84** 2.05*** 
Not Working -0.26 -0.65 0.39 
Environmentalists 1.74* 0.76 2.91*** 
Worry about equality? 0.40 0.82*** 0.50 
School spending 0.80 0.83** 1.09* 
Cox and Snell R2 0.366 0.372 0.461 
Nagelkerke R2 0.492 0.497 0.616 
  
Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space 
* significant at the .05 level  ** significant at the .01 level  ***significant at the .001 
level 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset
 
Results for the postmaterialism measure in Model B are also unimpressive.  The variables 
chosen here (affect toward environmentalists, worrying about equality, and the desire to spend 
more on schools) were all statistically significant indicators of likelihood to vote for Democratic 
presidential candidates in the 1990s and the affect toward environmentalists variable increased 
from insignificance in the 1980s to being a very strong indicator in the 2000s.  But 
inconsistencies and negative trends are problems for postmaterialism.  The equality measure 
gained in the 1990s, but dropped off in the 2000s.  And, just as affect toward environmentalists 
has increased since the 1980s, the school spending variable has been decreasing since then.  
Model C tests both materialism and postmaterialism in the same regression and the 
results are even less supportive of the hypothesis.  Defense spending is still a significant 
predictor of less Democratic affect, but became much less important in the 1990s and has 
become weaker since the 1980s.  Over that same time span, the jobs variable grew in importance 
and significance toward Democratic support.  What is interesting to note is that what is supposed 
to be a materialist indicator is the second best predictor of Democratic presidential voting in this 
decade. 
All things equal, those individuals who believe that the government has a responsibility 
to make sure that everyone has access to a decent job are much more likely to vote Democratic 
than those who do not.  Clearly, the postmaterialism variables are inconsistent.  The 
environmentalist variable is significant only in the 1980s and 2000s while the equality variable is 
significant in the 1990s alone.  Surprisingly, school spending grows as a predictor for 
Democratic support, in contrast to Model B in which it is falling.  In short the postmaterialism 
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hypothesis does not gather any support from this test due to the failure of these variables to 
register any change in Democratic affect. 
 
Table 4.2: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on House Vote Choice Nationwide, 1980s-2000s 
  House Party ID 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Model A             
Defense -1.41*** -1.64*** -1.51* -1.97*** -1.37*** -
Laid off -0.14 0.33 0.11 0.28 0.06 -0.36 
Jobs 0.99*** 1.17*** 0.95* 1.30*** 1.20*** 1.38** 
Not Working 0.40 -0.36 -0.66 0.12 -0.30 -0.11 
Cox and Snell R2 0.163 0.259 0.375 0.242 0.312 0.430 
Nagelkerke R2 0.218 0.346 0.499 0.323 0.417 0.574 
Model B             
Environmentalists 0.66 1.37*** 0.98 0.64 1.16*** 1.51***
Worry about equality? 0.15 0.55*** 0.89** 0.35 0.76*** 0.71** 
School spending 1.84*** 0.40** 0.64 1.34*** 0.95*** 0.98** 
Cox and Snell R2 0.224 0.245 0.361 0.217 0.281 0.371 
Nagelkerke R2 0.301 0.327 0.481 0.291 0.375 0.496 
Model C             
Defense -1.64** -1.56*** -1.55* -1.76*** -1.31*** -
Laid off 0.48 0.27 0.07 -0.24 0.11 -0.32 
Jobs 0.59 1.02*** 0.69 1.10** 1.05*** 1.16** 
Not Working 1.12 -0.35 -0.70 0.24 0.20 -0.37 
Environmentalists 1.11 0.72 1.00 1.07* 1.13*** 1.64* 
Worry about equality? -0.11 0.36 0.90* 0.15 0.65*** 0.45 
School spending 1.94*** 0.34 0.16 1.17*** 0.89*** 0.81 
Cox and Snell R2 0.257 0.267 0.389 0.241 0.346 0.436 
Nagelkerke R2 0.345 0.356 0.519 0.324 0.462 0.583 
Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space. * significant at the .05 level  ** significant at 
the .01 level  ***significant at the .001 level 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset     
 
 
Party identification may be the most promising predictor of postmaterialism from Models 
A and B.  The defense variable is significant and has a higher score than the jobs variable in 
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every decade and all three postmaterialist variables are significant by the 2000s.  Yet when all of 
the variables are entered in Model C, more problems become apparent.  The equality and school 
spending variables drop off, leaving the environmentalist scale as the sole significant indicator of 
the influence of postmaterialism on party identification.  Voting for House candidates appears 
even less tied to postmaterialism.  In the full model, the defense variable is again a very strong 
negative indicator in all the decades, but the postmaterialist variables are inconsistent and there 
are never any more than two significant variables out of seven going the predicted direction.  
In short, there is no evidence that the results described above are relegated simply to one 
aspect of Democratic affect or another.  There is clear and persistent evidence that inconsistent 
but positive Democratic affect is achieved from both materialist (excluding physical security) 
and postmaterialist values.  In terms of the hypotheses, there is no evidence to support either 
Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 3.  Both postmaterialist and materialist variables showed increases 
over time while two of the materialist variables never changed at all.  According to these data, 
there has been no nationwide realignment from materialist to postmaterialist values.  It is 
possible, however, that a realignment has occurred across regions that is not apparent in the data 
shown thus far.  To determine if there has been such a realignment, more analyses must be 
performed. 
To show the results from the six different regions, the tables are truncated.  Separating 
materialism and postmaterialism in the different regions does not yield any different results and 
have been omitted, so only Model C is shown for the regional analyses.  As there are fewer cases 
in the presidential and House tests and there is no major difference between the three dependent 
variables, only the regression on partisan identification will be displayed in Table 4.3 
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Table 4.3: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on Partisan Identification By Region 1980s – 2000s 
  Northeast North Central 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Defense -2.64** -0.87 -5.10** -1.15 -0.49 -2.31 
Laid off -0.43 0.08 -0.21 -0.26 0.21 1.16 
Jobs 1.68* 0.58 -0.76 2.49** 1.60*** 1.19 
Not Working 0.24 -0.57 1.30 1.87 0.28 1.08 
Environmentalists 0.79 0.78 1.94 -0.32 1.64** 2.75* 
Worry about equality? 0.02 0.66 2.09* 0.07 0.56 -0.59 
School spending 0.70 1.24** 1.15 1.62* 0.59 0.48 
Cox and Snell R2 0.236 0.296 0.508 0.282 0.348 0.386 
Nagelkerke R2 0.318 0.395 0.679 0.389 0.466 0.521 
  Border South Solid South 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Defense -2.63 -7.43** -------- -2.44** -1.58*** -1.24 
Laid off -------- -2.61 -------- 0.34 0.09 0.06 
Jobs -1.23 1.10 -------- -0.12 0.99** 1.93* 
Not Working 0.05 -------- -------- 0.54 -1.38** -1.29 
Environmentalists 3.48 -0.79 -------- 1.99 0.86 1.56 
Worry about equality? 3.55* 2.16* -------- 0.72 0.78** 0.47 
School spending 4.51 -0.84 -------- 0.95 1.16** 1.62 
Cox and Snell R2 0.386 0.523 -------- 0.254 0.371 0.455 
Nagelkerke R2 0.518 0.698 -------- 0.339 0.497 0.609 
  Pacific West Mountain West 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Defense -3.00* -1.49* -3.58 -4.52 -1.83** -0.32 
Laid off -0.24 -0.21 0.34 -3.05* 0.41 1.28 
Jobs 1.45 0.62 2.56 4.48* 2.24** 5.51** 
Not Working -0.03 0.56 -------- -------- 0.43 -------- 
Environmentalists 2.71 1.71* 4.30 -2.69 2.04* -1.02 
Worry about equality? 0.01 0.44 -0.62 -1.86 1.01 0.15 
School spending 1.63 1.71** 1.06 5.04 0.96 2.05 
Cox and Snell R2 0.357 0.401 0.578 0.389 0.262 0.372 
Nagelkerke R2 0.479 0.535 0.770 0.519 0.351 0.498 
Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space   * significant at the .05 level ** significant at the 
.01 level ***significant at the .001 level 




There are three possible types of regions4 with regard to postmaterialism.  The first 
would be a region where materialism is waning in importance and postmaterialism is gaining 
importance, just as Inglehart’s hypothesis predicts.  For this analysis, this type of region will be 
called a “postmaterialist region”.  The second region would be the exact opposite, in which 
materialism is gaining in importance while postmaterialism trails off called a “materialist 
region”.  The third type is a “trendless region”, in which none of the regions show a great 
tendency toward one or another type of value system at any point in time, or the values lie along 
a flat line, never gaining nor losing value.  Most of the regions fit best in this last “trendless” 
category. 
Inglehart’s postmaterialism hypothesis gets its greatest support in the North Central 
region.  Here, defense spending is completely insignificant and the jobs variable has declined 
from positive and significant to insignificant.  On the postmaterialism side, the environmentalist 
variable has been gaining since the 1980s and the other two have been insignificant with the 
                                                 
4 Regressions in this chapter were plagued with the problem of having too few cases in 
the Border South and the Mountain West.  The obvious solution to this problem would be to 
group the regions together, but this was not done because the states in question did not seem to 
fit with any other regions.  The Border South States were not a part of the Solid South which was 
so essential to the Democratic party in the first half of the 20th century.  Mostly agrarian states 
such as Kentucky and West Virginia have little in common with states like Massachusetts and 
New York where the majority of the population lives in urban centers.  The Mountain West also 
has little in common with the perennially progressive west coast. 
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exception of the school spending variable in the 1980s.  This region is the most like the 
“postmaterialist region” described above.  The Northeast fits in between the “trendless” and 
“postmaterialist” type of region.  The defense spending measure has grown in significance since 
the 1980s and the jobs measure has dropped off while the postmaterialist variables are mainly 
trendless except for the equality measure which has gained in significance over the course of the 
three decades. 
There is nothing close to a positive trend in the postmaterialist variables in the other 
regions.  In many cases, the variables became positive and significant in one decade only to lose 
significance or turn negative in the next.  In the case of the Border and Solid South, and the 
Pacific and Mountain West regions, there is absolutely no evidence of a shift toward 
postmaterialist values.  This is especially apparent in the Solid South and the Mountain West, 
where the jobs variable has become more indicative of Democratic partisan identification over 
the years.  For this reason, these regions could be classified as “trendless” regions leaning more 
toward “materialist” regions.  The Pacific West and Border South can safely be classified as 
completely “trendless” as there is virtually no trend whatsoever. 
What is important to recognize is that despite the fact that some of these regions fit more 
with Inglehart’s postmaterialism hypothesis than others, postmaterialism fails to explain voting 
patterns in any of the regions.  Two economic security variables never showed any signs of being 
significant and negative as postmaterialism suggests.  Rather than seeing solid and reliable trends 
toward more positive and significant numbers in the postmaterialist variables, the vast majority 
of the postmaterialist values indicators are insignificant and any change is not durable, making 
the change “trendless.”  It is also important to note that this is not intended to proclaim the 
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destruction of postmaterialism.  I did not intend for these variables to duplicate the entirety of 
Inglehart’s hypothesis.  However, these are not the results one would expect to find if 
postmaterialist values were increasing in significance among Americans.  What should be gained 
from this discussion is an understanding that postmaterialism does not explain very much with 
regard to American political behavior.   
To conclude this section, the hypotheses will be revisited.  Hypothesis 1 stated that 
postmaterialism would generate more affect toward Democrats.  This is clearly not the case.  
Although some postmaterialist values are significant indicators of Democratic affect at some 
times, the findings are inconsistent and unimpressive.  One would expect to see that all of the 
postmaterialist variables would be significant and positive and all of the materialist variables 
would be significant and negative at all points if postmaterialism were a correct hypothesis.  
Since this is hardly true, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by these data. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that postmaterialist values would generate greater affect toward the 
Democratic party over time.  This is also not supported by the data.  Sometimes the variables 
would become more influential, sometimes less, and sometimes not at all.  Inconsistencies in the 
outcomes of these analyses lead to the dismissal of Hypothesis 3 as well.  Hypothesis 5 stated 
that individuals in the Northeast and Pacific West would most likely exhibit postmaterialism in 
their political behavior.  To the contrary, the North Central region showed the greatest signs of 
postmaterialist behavior followed by the Northeast.  The Pacific West was shown to be a 
“trendless region” in that hardly any of the variables in the model had any influence at all.  As 
these two regions did not show signs of greater postmaterialism, Hypothesis 5 must also be 
discarded.   
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Moral Values Results and Discussion 
Table 4.4 shows results from the logistical regression of religiosity and moral values on 
presidential vote choice.  Right away it is evident that both moral values and attitude toward 
abortion both have a significant and growing effect on presidential vote choice.  As of this 
decade, all of the separate religion and religiosity variables are neutralized in light of these 
variables.  In fact, attitudes toward moral values have an influence on presidential vote choice 
rivaled only by race.  Not only are the coefficients for the values variables growing but so are the 
pseudo-R2 measures, indicating that the predictive power of this model is growing.  But it is 
possible that this is only true for presidential voting patterns.  Table 4.5 reproduced this model 
for House voting and partisan identification. 
It appears in Table 4.5 that the extraordinary growing effect of moral values may be just a 
presidential voting phenomenon.  In House voting, moral values dropped to insignificance in the 
2000s while only abortion showed signs of increasing influence.  The opposite happened in the 
party identification table as the moral values index grew and the abortion variable dropped off.  
In both of these models, the pseudo-R2 statistics grew as well, indicating that the variables 
included explained more of the variance in House voting and party identification.  It is unclear at 
this time why this is so.  Perhaps the media attention given to presidential candidates’ values 
systems and positions on abortion give voters more cause to vote for or against presidential 
candidates concerning these issues than for congressional candidates.  Another factor might be 
incumbency.  Congressional incumbents enjoy much greater chances of victory in elections 
compared to challengers.  Perhaps this edge helps insulate incumbents from voters’ judgments of 
values.  Initial evidence performed for this paper provided little evidence for this hypothesis and 
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will thus not be presented here.  More exhaustive studies ought to be pursued in order to uncover 
this perplexing phenomenon.  It will suffice to say here that values issues clearly have a growing 
effect on presidential vote choice, but a less clear and decisive effect on House vote choice and 
partisan identification.  
 
Table 4.4: Moral Values on Presidential Vote Choice Nationwide, 1980s-2000s 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic 0.27 0.26 0.38 
Jewish 1.25* 1.34* 1.15 
Evangelical -0.15 0.07 -0.10 
Attendance 0.35 -0.08 0.11 
Importance 0.26 0.03 0.16 
Moral Values -1.28* -2.15*** -2.41*** 
Abortion -0.28 -0.59** -0.99** 
Age 0.21 1.15*** 0.69* 
Black 2.77*** 2.78*** 2.69*** 
Female 0.02 0.16 0.08 
Education -0.71* -0.93*** -0.37 
Ideology -4.34*** -3.92*** -5.71*** 
Cox and Snell R2 0.282 0.316 0.397 
Nagelkerke R2 0.379 0.423 0.591 
Notes: * significant at the .05 level **significant at the .01 level ***significant at the 
.01 level 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
Also of interest in these tables is that religious preference and religiosity have hardly any 
influence on political behavior at all.  Catholicism and Judaism have much more influence over 
individuals’ votes than evangelical Christianity.  Only once is the evangelical variable 
significant, but it is positive, signaling that evangelicals were more likely to identify as 
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Democratic in the 1990s than mainline Protestants.  Similarly, neither frequency of attendance 
nor importance of religion to one’s daily life have any lasting effect on political behavior.  Only 
in the 1990s did either of these variables produce significant effects; attendance was negatively 
associated with Democratic House votes and the importance of religion was positively associated 
with Democratic partisan identification.  These results lead to the conclusion that religious 
preference and religiosity have little to do with political behavior – it is the degree of moral 
conservatism that truly matters here. 
 
Table 4.5: Moral Values on House Vote Choice and Partisan Identification Nationwide, 1980s-2000s 
  House Party ID 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic 0.67*** 0.38*** 0.20 0.47** 0.58*** 0.21
Jewish 0.62 1.13** 0.30 0.51 1.52*** 1.70** 
Evangelical 0.33 0.12 -0.42 0.26 0.40*** 0.26 
Attendance 0.15 -0.31* -0.05 0.19 0.10 0.35
Importance 0.13 0.12 -0.21 -0.02 0.35** 0.23 
Moral Values -0.87* -1.11*** -0.59 -0.77* -1.72*** -2.07***
Abortion -0.13 -0.20 -0.97** -0.14 -0.35** -0.38 
Age -0.03 0.40* 0.36 0.75*** 0.77*** 0.43
Black 1.63*** 1.64*** 3.40*** 1.75*** 1.68*** 2.49*** 
Female -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 0.15 0.20** 0.28 
Education -0.81** -1.23*** -0.91* -0.28 -1.06*** -0.68 
Ideology -2.97*** -3.42*** -5.17*** -3.44*** -4.21*** -5.39*** 
Cox and Snell R2 0.171 0.229 0.360 0.189 0.267 0.350 
Nagelkerke R2 0.229 0.305 0.480 0.253 0.356 0.468 
Notes: * significant at the .05 level **significant at the .01 level ***significant at the .01 level 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
For a regional analysis of the moral values issues, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are presented.  In 
terms of presidential vote choice, the moral values index has a profound effect in every 
measurable region.  In the Northeast, North Central, and Pacific West regions, the index grew 
from insignificance in the 1980s to an incredibly strong, significant indicator by the 2000s.  
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What is unexpected (and inconsistent with Hypothesis 6) is that the Solid South sustained the 
only reduction in influence of moral values of all the regions.  By the 2000s, the Northeast and 
Pacific West displayed greater scores for moral values in presidential voting than the Solid 
South.   
These results are important for many reasons.  The first is that moral traditionalism is not 
confined to one specific region of the country.  The situation displayed in Table 4.6 is far from 
one in which moral conservatism plays different roles in the different regions.  Rather, moral 
conservatism has similar effects in all measurable regions.  Although the measure is not 
significant in the Mountain West, this is most probably because there are not many cases from 
those states.  The measure is still very high there, as it is in the other regions.  The second 
important aspect of these results is the fact that the effect of what is considered an incredibly 
important cultural issue – abortion – is largely marginalized in light of moral conservatism in 
general.  This signals that perhaps it is not actual issues that cause divisions between the two 
parties, but rather the more abstract idea of moral conservatism.  That is, moral values issues 
might be less about abortion and other rights issues and more about feelings of moral certitude 
and the need to force one’s morals on others.  Another important facet of these results is that in 
all regions, moral conservatism increased in predictive strength between the 1990s and the 
2000s.  This is immediately in stark contrast to the results provided in the immediately preceding 
chapter.  While class was declining as an indicator of Democratic affect in all regions, moral 
conservatism has increased.  A more complete analysis of the implications of this finding will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  It will suffice to say here that values have become increasingly 
salient while values have become less so, possibly indicating that a realignment is occurring. 
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Contrast between the presidential voting results and the House voting results is immense.  
Where all regions (excluding the Solid South and those with too few cases) in the Presidential 
voting table saw increases in the moral values indicator, almost none saw any significance 
whatsoever in terms of House voting.  Clearly whatever is causing the difference in the effect of 
moral values between the two branches is not regional.  Abortion rarely has any effect on House 
voting choice and when it does, a trend does not develop.  Just as in presidential voting patterns, 
religious preference and religiosity have practically no effect.   
In terms of the hypotheses, these data again show mixed results.  Hypothesis 2 suggested 
that individuals scoring higher on the moral values variables would be less likely to vote and 
identify as Democratic than those scoring lower on the moral values variables.  This has been 
shown to be the case for presidential voting, but not for House voting or partisan identification.  
Hypothesis 4 claimed that over time moral values would become more important to the decision-
making of American voters.  Again, in the presidential voting model, this appears to be the case 
while in the House voting and party identification models, there is no evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  Hypothesis 6 suggested that the Solid South and North Central regions would be 
influenced more by moral values than other regions due to their conservative moral stances on 
cultural issues such as abortion.  The Solid South was the only region in this analysis in which 
moral values actually declined as an indicator of presidential voting.  Furthermore, in no region 
did moral values display a large effect on House voting.  Hypothesis 6, which stated that moral 





Table 4.6: Moral Values and Presidential Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s 
  Northeast North Central 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic 0.04 0.41 0.44 0.90* -0.03 0.12 
Jewish 1.16 1.81 -0.53 0.94 -------- -1.91 
Evangelical 1.17 -0.50 1.14 0.05 -0.18 -0.35 
Attendance 0.21 0.59 -1.17 -0.51 -0.33 0.70 
Importance 0.17 -0.52 1.29 0.21 0.33 -0.50 
Moral Values -2.29 -2.32** -2.71* -0.42 -1.87** -2.11* 
Abortion 0.89 -0.51 -0.94 0.18 -0.27 0.65 
Cox and Snell R2 0.336 0.285 0.461 0.314 0.267 0.361 
Nagelkerke R2 0.450 0.382 0.614 0.422 0.362 0.484 
  Border South Solid South 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic -------- 2.69 -------- 0.24 0.14 0.15 
Jewish -------- -------- -------- 1.36 0.48 -------- 
Evangelical -------- 2.67 -------- -0.74 0.44 -0.14 
Attendance -------- -5.39 -------- 0.73 0.40 0.15 
Importance -------- 1.62 -------- 1.09 -0.32 0.33 
Moral Values -------- -5.15 -------- -2.52* -1.94** -2.34* 
Abortion -------- 3.14 -------- -0.80 -1.04* -0.62 
Cox and Snell R2 -------- 0.600 -------- 0.313 0.381 0.412 
Nagelkerke R2 -------- 0.805 -------- 0.419 0.511 0.554 
  Pacific West Mountain West 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic 0.10 -0.16 1.11 -------- 0.74 1.89 
Jewish 2.35 1.93 -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Evangelical -0.30 -0.97 0.58 -------- 0.18 -------- 
Attendance 1.43 -1.49* -0.67 -------- -0.18 2.87 
Importance -0.35 0.48 1.35 -------- 1.08 1.72 
Moral Values -0.78 -3.01** -4.35* -------- -2.57 -6.33 
Abortion -0.29 0.65 -2.86** -------- -1.17 -1.26 
Cox and Snell R2 0.337 0.393 0.531 -------- 0.307 0.541 
Nagelkerke R2 0.459 0.529 0.708 -------- 0.409 0.739 
Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space * significant at the .05 level ** significant at the 
.01 level ***significant at the .001 level 







Table 4.7: Moral Values and House Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s 
  Northeast North Central 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic 1.62*** 0.31 -0.02 0.54 0.26 0.05 
Jewish 1.88* 2.06 -1.21 1.38 1.13 -------- 
Evangelical -0.21 -0.12 0.37 -0.21 0.12 -0.15 
Attendance 1.14 -0.05 0.29 -0.60 -0.40 0.71 
Importance -0.42 -0.42 -0.35 0.50 -0.09 0.43 
Moral Values -0.03 -0.30 -0.95 -1.03 -1.44** -1.67 
Abortion -0.22 -0.43 -1.06 0.16 -0.21 -1.20* 
Cox and Snell R2 0.225 0.222 0.445 0.235 0.228 0.363 
Nagelkerke R2 0.301 0.297 0.594 0.313 0.304 0.487 
  Border South Solid South 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic -------- 1.80** -------- 1.02 0.46 0.801 
Jewish -------- -0.43 -------- -1.29 0.52 -1.05 
Evangelical -------- 1.15 -------- -0.13 0.13 -0.20 
Attendance -------- 0.36 -------- 0.59 -0.10 -1.26* 
Importance -------- 0.13 -------- -0.05 0.22 -1.35 
Moral Values -------- -1.60 -------- -0.63 -1.10* -0.77 
Abortion -------- -0.32 -------- -0.32 -0.14 0.02 
Cox and Snell R2 -------- 0.255 -------- 0.168 0.246 0.358 
Nagelkerke R2 -------- 0.341 -------- 0.235 0.330 0.483 
  Pacific West Mountain West 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Catholic 0.40 -0.14 -0.03 -------- 1.17* -------- 
Jewish 1.67 1.67 -------- -------- 6.64 -------- 
Evangelical 0.96 -0.57 -0.42 -------- 1.28* -------- 
Attendance -0.02 -0.85* 0.64 -------- -0.59 -------- 
Importance -0.08 0.54 1.91 -------- 1.21 -------- 
Moral Values -1.83 -1.16 -1.42 -------- -3.23** -------- 
Abortion -0.18 0.24 -0.77 -------- -1.46* -------- 
Cox and Snell R2 0.234 0.288 0.492 -------- 0.363 -------- 
Nagelkerke R2 0.312 0.385 0.660 -------- 0.486 -------- 
Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space  * significant at the .05 level ** significant at the 
.01 level ***significant at the .001 level 






Both postmaterialist and moral values have resulted in unexpected and mixed results.  
Postmaterialism does not appear to have a great influence on American political behavior at all.  
In fact, all three hypotheses regarding the strength of postmaterialism failed to have garnered any 
support from the data.  While some regions (e.g. North Central and Northeast) show more signs 
of a growing influence of postmaterialist values, it can hardly be said that postmaterialism 
explains a great deal about individual political behavior anywhere.  Moral values, however, do 
show signs of support from the data concerning presidential voting patterns.  Moral conservatism 
is incredibly predictive of support for Democratic presidential candidates.  This effect has been 
growing since the 1980s to the point where moral values now have virtually the same predictive 
power as race.  In fact, moral conservatism has been a growing indicator of negative Democratic 
affect since the 1980s.  Perhaps most important in terms of this paper, the influence of moral 
conservatism has been growing during the same time that class has been declining.  These moral 
values fail, however, to explain House voting and partisan identification anywhere in the 
country.  With these results, and those of the previous chapter, the next chapter will attempt to 
merge the knowledge gained from these two chapters and to determine which matters more to 
American voters: class or values? 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
What is to be taken from the preceding analyses?  What has been discovered about the 
relationships between class and political behavior and values and political behavior?  What 
values do Americans take with them to the ballot box?  In which regions does class matter more 
and in which do values matter more?  To answer these questions, some final results will be 
shown and a more exhaustive analysis of these results will be undertaken. 
In chapter three, it was shown that in all three categories of political behavior, class has 
had an increasing influence which peaked in the 1990s.  This left the door open to the idea that 
values have had an increasing effect in this decade.  The rise of George W. Bush to the 
presidency and Republican dominance in Congress are potential indicators of an increasing 
influence of values in politics.  Chapter four concluded with the finding that moral conservatism 
had been rising during the same time in which class had been losing salience among voters.  
These facts, coupled with ever-increasing reductions in abortion and homosexual rights, make it 
easy to believe that a culture war is playing out in American politics.  But is the void left by class 
in explaining vote choice and identification after the 1990s filled by the voters’ values?  Is moral 
conservatism really becoming more influential? 
According to the data presented thus far it is evident that, at least in presidential voting, 
moral values and abortion might have become more powerful indicators of vote choice than 
class.  Both moral values indicators had highly significant and growing negative scores in recent 
decades while class measures have been declining since the 1990s.  There is no evidence that 
postmaterialist values have become influential at all, due to the inconsistent nature of the 
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indicators.  What is left to determine is whether or not moral values have displaced class as the 
leading predictor of presidential voting behavior. 
 
Table 5.1: Class and Moral Values on Presidential Vote 1980s-2000s 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 
Low Income 0.57* 0.42* 0.27 
Middle Income 0.55** 0.27 0.27 
      
Catholic 0.27 0.25 0.46 
Jewish 1.24* 1.18* 1.16 
Evangelical -0.17 0.03 -0.24 
      
Attendance 0.21 -0.03 0.21 
Importance 0.38 -0.01 0.13 
      
Moral values -1.38** -2.16*** -2.60*** 
Abortion -0.33 -0.62** -1.11** 
      
Cox and Snell R2 0.294 0.325 0.416 
Nagelkerke R2 0.394 0.435 0.566 
 
Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable.  Other 
independent variables have been omitted.  * significant at the .05 level 
** significant at the .01 level *** significant at the .001 level 
 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
Table 5.1 displays the regression output for class and moral values variables on 
presidential vote choice.  Clearly class begins to fizzle out as a predictor of presidential voting 
after the 1980s.  By the 2000s, the effects of class are completely neutralized by the immense 
effect of moral values and abortion attitudes.  Both of these variables are extraordinarily negative 
predictors of Democratic presidential vote choice starting in the 1990s and increasing into the 
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21st century.  According to the data then, moral values are much more important to presidential 
voters than class, religious preference, and the importance of religion in one’s life.  House voting 
and partisan identification still fail to show the same results.  In these models (which are 
omitted), neither class nor moral values exhibit a tendency shown by moral values in the 
presidential voting model. 
Again the data forces the question of why presidential voting is so obviously tied to 
moral values and abortion attitudes while other political behavior is not.  One part of this 
equation might be the fact that so much more attention is paid to presidential candidates than 
congressional candidates.  Presidential candidates’ lives are dissected in the national media to the 
point where virtually every detail of one’s life is on display every day on television, in the 
newspaper, and more recently, on the internet.  The national spotlight now shines on areas 
formerly considered off-limits to the public, including areas of faith and moral attitudes.  Perhaps 
as the flow of information about moral beliefs of presidential candidates has become increasingly 
available and discussion-worthy, individuals have attempted to match their own values to those 
of the candidates.  This information is much less common for congressional candidates, as they 
generally do not garner national attention.  A suggestion for future research would be to 
determine the amount of media attention individual congressional candidates receive and to see 
if values have a greater effect on individual vote choice for those receiving more attention when 
compared with those receiving less. 
Another hypothesis is that the incumbency of congressional candidates coupled with the 




Table 5.2: Moral Values and Class on Presidential Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s 
  Northeast North Central 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Low Income 0.22 0.34 -1.13 -0.01 0.56 0.66 
Middle Income 1.03* 0.14 -1.65 -0.08 0.47 0.69 
            
Moral Values -2.58 -2.38** -5.32** -0.80 0.61 -1.35 
Abortion 1.29 -0.48 -0.63 -0.34 -1.98** -0.75 
            
Cox and Snell R2 0.367 0.278 0.540 0.315 0.295 0.375 
Nagelkerke R2 0.492 0.374 0.721 0.425 0.400 0.503 
  Border South Solid South 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Low Income -------- -1.25 -------- 1.00 0.29 1.14* 
Middle Income -------- -2.07 -------- 0.55 0.09 0.58 
            
Moral Values -------- -3.60 -------- -2.47* -1.92** -2.37* 
Abortion -------- 3.34 -------- -0.89 -0.96* -1.04 
            
Cox and Snell R2 -------- 0.596 -------- 0.337 0.390 0.434 
Nagelkerke R2 -------- 0.801 -------- 0.452 0.523 0.584 
  Pacific West Mountain West 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Low Income 0.10 1.29* 0.18 -------- 0.16 0.31 
Middle Income 0.14 0.76 0.39 -------- -0.01 3.27 
            
Moral Values -0.49 -3.05** -3.09 -------- -2.71 -9.99 
Abortion -0.49 0.63 -3.00* -------- -1.29 -2.96 
            
Cox and Snell R2 0.350 0.408 0.525 -------- 0.299 0.567 
Nagelkerke R2 0.475 0.550 0.704 -------- 0.400 0.774 
       
Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable.  Other independent variables 
have been omitted for space  * significant at the .05 level ** significant at the .01 level 
***significant at the .001 level 
       




Individuals are more likely to vote for an incumbent candidate than a challenger for many 
reasons (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003).  Perhaps this incumbency advantage allows House 
candidates to disregard moral values as a potential issue for voters.  On a related note, it is 
possible that uncontested seats are partly responsible for the lack of influence on vote choice.  If 
individuals have no choice at all, values can have no chance to have an influence.  Future 
research should consider these possibilities when studying the effects of moral values on House 
vote choice. 
Whatever is behind the difference in effect of moral values between House and 
presidential elections, the difference in effect is apparent in all regions.  Regressions were 
performed as above for each region and are reported in Table 5.2.  Moral values and/or abortion 
are significant in the Northeast, Pacific West, and Solid South regions.  The Solid South’s great 
propensity for class voting is apparent in the table as low income voters are much more likely to 
vote Democratic than upper income voters, despite the effect of values and all the other 
independent variables.  Still moral conservatism has a greater effect on presidential vote choice 
than class even in the Solid South. 
Having made these discoveries, the questions raised in the introduction can now be fully 
addressed.  The first series of questions raised dealt with regional differences.  Realignment 
theory was discussed in the literature review in order to provide a framework through which we 
might understand regional change.  It is apparent from these results that there is real potential for 
a presidential voting realignment on a national scale from class-based to values-based cleavages.  
What is not apparent, however, is a significant regional difference in voting patterns.  For 
example, in a regional realignment we might expect postmaterialist values to become more 
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significant than class in some regions while moral values become more salient in others.  This 
does not appear to be happening.  Instead, all regions appear to have traded class voting for 
values voting, with the exception of the Solid South in which class has retained its significance.  
Although a regional split does not seem to have occurred, there are more subtle differences in the 
values between regions.  In the Northeast, the moral conservatism index is very strongly related 
to presidential vote choice, but the abortion debate does not hold much sway over these voters.  
In contrast the Pacific West has become much more attuned to the abortion issue.  In these states, 
the general idea of traditional values holds less sway than the more specific moral issue of 
abortion.  It will suffice to say here that there is a real potential for a secular nationwide 
realignment to occur, but not based on regional lines. 
 
Table 5.3: Mean Values and Abortion Attitude Scores by Religious Group 
  Values Abortion 
  Mean N SD Mean N SD 
Catholic 0.59 3472 0.189 0.41 5137 0.362 
Jewish 0.46 206 0.219 0.12 354 0.243 
Mainline Protestant 0.61 3420 0.201 0.29 5299 0.320 
Evangelical Protestant 0.67 4428 0.205 0.51 6566 0.356 
Other Religion 0.61 516 0.250 0.40 752 0.387 
Atheist/Agnostic 0.43 22 0.200 0.16 53 0.288 
Total 0.62 12064 0.206 0.40 18161 0.360 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
The next series of questions were concerned with the effect of evangelical Christians on 
political behavior.  The past twenty-five years have witnessed the rise of the religious right from 
church basements to the White House.  Political discussions at dinner tables and in the halls of 
Congress are often dominated by talk of values that emanate from evangelical belief systems.  
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Due to the apparent importance of this particular religious preference, one would certainly expect 
a voter that holds evangelical Christian beliefs to vote differently than would a voter what prefers 
another or no religion.  But the data insist that evangelical voters act the same as mainline 
Protestants in almost every case.  More often, Jewish and Catholic voters tend to vote and 
identify more as Democratic. 
Perhaps the reason why this is so is because of the fact that evangelicals claim to be more 
morally conservative than members of other religions.  Table 5.3 displays the mean score of 
individuals in each religious group on the moral conservatism index and the abortion attitude 
scale used in the preceding analyses.  Evangelical Protestants have the highest moral 
conservatism score and least permissive attitudes toward abortion of any religion.  Scoring 0.05 
higher than the mean total and 0.06 higher than mainline Protestants, evangelicals easily have the 
most morally conservative responses of any religious group in America.  It can be concluded 
then that the reason evangelical religious preferences seem to wield such influence on voters is 
because of the moral traditionalism evangelicals hold.  In other words, evangelical Christianity is 
politically influential by proxy of the morally traditional values its members hold. 
Conclusion 
Although the question is far from settled, there is clear evidence that class voting has 
given way to values voting, at least at the presidential level.  There are many potential 
implications of this finding.  Politically, Democratic elites ought to work on neutralizing the 
effects of moral conservatism and Republicans ought to maximize this division.  Moral 
conservatism has become more effective in every decade since the 1980s at driving voters away 
from Democratic presidential candidates, and the tides show no signs of stopping.  If Democrats 
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hope to propel their own candidate to victory in 2008, how they react to moral issues must 
receive serious attention.  Republicans are the beneficiaries of this divide.  So long as the nation 
is more morally conservative than progressive, Republicans would do well to follow a familiar 
divide-and-conquer strategy. 
What appears to be happening, though, is that the population is becoming more morally 
progressive over time.  Since the 1980s, the moral conservatism index has undergone a 
statistically significant decline, signaling a more progressive trend.  While Republicans are the 
current beneficiaries of this trend, Democrats need not be left out.  The Democratic party has 
been reluctant to tackle values issues during this period of increasing salience.  In order to 
benefit from this political trend, the Democratic party needs to unite on common values issues 
and communicate that unity to the voters.  Without a consistent message, all the voters will know 
of the values of the Democratic party is what the Republicans say.  Only if the Republican party 
is countered on the values issues with a morally progressive and cohesive message, will the 
Democrats have much hope in the future.  This message ought to focus on acceptance of others, 
even if we don’t necessarily agree with their morals.  The results in this paper suggest that moral 
conservatism is driving a wedge between presidential voters; Democrats need only supply 
leverage to that wedge in order to gain support. 
There is evidence that this is occurring on a small scale at present.  Just as Republicans 
used state constitutional amendment ballot initiatives on moral values issues like the ban on gay 
marriage in recent national elections, Democrats are attempting to use a minimum wage increase 
as a values issue to increase turnout in the 2006 election.  National figures such as Ted Kennedy 
have spoken passionately about that subject recently, saying that “part of American values are 
 77
 
economic fairness” in reference to the minimum wage (Hennessy-Fiske 2006).  Churches have 
also weighed in on this issue, lending credence to the moral values aspect of the minimum wage 
raise.  Steve Copley of the National Council of Churches said recently that increasing the 
minimum wage “is truly a moral issue, a faith issue and a family values issue” (“Huckabee Signs 
Minimum Wage Raise” 2006).  These are signs that Democrats are becoming more aware of the 
necessity to tackle the values issues, and this may help win elections in the short term.  But the 
evidence from this paper suggests that a more holistic values agenda ought to be expressed 
which goes beyond issues, encompassing more areas of moral progressivism. 
In the meantime, Republicans have certainly had the edge on the moral values issues.  
With no progressive alternative, all values issues have been framed by the more conservative 
party.  To continue benefiting from this political division, Republicans need to continue on their 
current path.  This is still a morally conservative nation, even though it is less so since the 1980s.  
So long as the Democratic party is oblivious to the values issues that voters are focusing on, the 
Republican party will continue to fare well.  The rules of the game could easily change, however, 
if the Democrats incorporate moral values issues and ideals.  As Table 5.4 illustrates, Democrats 
are closer to Independents than Republicans on the moral conservatism scale and the abortion 
measure.  Independent T-tests revealed that there is a less significant difference between 
Democrats and Independents than there is between Republicans and Independents on both 
variables.  If Democrats frame values issues in a way that resonates with Independent voters, 
they could add many Independents that vote with the Republican party because of values issues. 
It should also be noted that despite the fact that these results were only significant for 
presidential voting patterns, other levels of government are immune from values issues.  One 
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hypothesis I discussed in the previous section was that media attention to the presidential race 
could be making the values of the candidates more available.  The ever-increasing size of 
internet-based political action and discussion could easily change this.  Media outlets have 
unlimited space with which to fill information (and advertisements), and the most influential 
blogs now have daily traffic in the hundreds of thousands of individuals.  If more information 
about candidates for lower offices are disseminated through these newer outlets, perhaps values 
might have a greater effect on vote choice of lower-level candidates over time. 
 
Table 5.4: Mean Moral Conservatism and Abortion Scores by Party Identification, 2004 
 Moral Conservatism Abortion 
 Mean N SD Mean N SD 
Republican 0.66 443 0.193 0.48 434 0.353 
Independent 0.55 96 0.198 0.40 98 0.358 
Democrat 0.48 503 0.220 0.33 499 0.352 
Total 0.56 1042 0.225 0.40 1031 0.360 
 
Source: 2004 NES Dataset 
 
 
In terms of research, other studies could expand on these findings.  The question 
concerning the difference in effect of values between presidential and House elections is still not 
answered.  New research can determine whether or not moral conservatism compels individuals 
to vote.  Special attention could be paid to individual characteristics of presidential candidates to 
determine of there is some charismatic influence on values voters.  The nature of the realignment 
also ought to be studied.  Analyses for this line of study might ask whether the parties themselves 
have changed in order to increase the political saliency of moral values or if extra-political   
actors such as televangelists have had a more active role in changing the political climate.  The 
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findings in this paper can also help attain more accurate results in other political behavior 
research.  Discussions on the political effects of class ought to take moral values and abortion 
attitudes into consideration. 
In the introduction to this paper, I discussed how the media portrayed the electoral 
victories of George W. Bush.  If one were to take these sources at face value, it would seem that 
moral values had an effect which generated massive amounts of support for the Republican 
candidate.  Through the course of this paper, it has been determined that moral conservatism and 
abortion attitudes do have more influence over individual vote choice for presidential candidates.  





APPENDIX A: EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS AND THE SOLID SOUTH  
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In Chapter One, some statements were made about the prevalence of evangelical 
Christians in the south, and their growing political behavior.  I have assembled the following 
tables from the same dataset as the original text in order to provide evidene to these facts.  Tables 
A.1 shows that evangelical Protestantism is overrepresented in the Solid South, especially 
amongst individuals with low incomes.  Table A.2 shows that the percentage of voters who 
prefer evangelical Protestantism has risen since the 1960s. 
   
Table A.1: Percentage of Evangelical Christians in the South and Non-South  
  Percent of Evangelicals Percent of Total Population 
Southerners 51.4% 29.9%
      Low Income 25.5% 13.1% 
      Middle Income 16.0% 9.3% 
      High Income 9.8% 7.6% 
Non-southerners 48.6% 70.1%
      Low Income 18.2% 20.0% 
      Middle Income 17.2% 23.8% 
      High Income 13.2% 26.2% 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
 
Table A.2: Percentage of Voters With 










APPENDIX B: NUMBERS OF CASES IN EACH TABLE 
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Due to the differences in variable choice and combinations of variables in each of the 
tables in the text, the number of cases in each table varies.  Due to the already large amount of 
space taken up by the tables, I have opted to report the numbers of cases in each table in this 
appendix through a series of separate tables.  The corresponding tables are identified in the title 
of each table. 
 
Table B.1 Numbers of Low- and High-Income Respondents by Region and Decade, 1952-2004 
(Corresponds to Tables 3.2 and 3.3)
 Northeast North Central Border South 
 Pres. House PID Pres. House PID Pres. House PID 
1950s 480 605 865 650 798 1101 56 64 147 
1960s 542 679 1013 673 882 1348 130 128 277 
1970s 401 684 1324 591 1010 1741 109 169 429 
1980s 399 532 969 576 802 1425 88 119 252 
1990s 311 501 986 465 825 1415 59 105 191 
2000s 206 178 305 320 291 445 44 29 64 
 Solid South Pacific West Mountain West 
 Pres. House PID Pres. House PID Pres. House PID 
1950s 295 329 814 172 199 324 62 73 115 
1960s 437 534 1098 258 340 541 66 84 130 
1970s 435 657 1696 266 453 812 67 145 227 
1980s 543 717 1704 378 480 825 87 124 258 
1990s 519 819 1904 249 435 772 110 192 349 
2000s 353 265 577 204 169 298 65 58 105 




Table B.2: Number of Total Income Respondents by Decade (Corresponds to Table 3.4)
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
President 2308 2888 2780 3169 2524 1616
House 2832 2651 2294 2300 4171 1330
Party Identification 5623 6440 9349 8266 8182 2368
   




Table B.3: Number of Total Income Respondents By Decade and Region, 1952-2004 
(Corresponds with Tables 3.5 and 3.6) 
 Northeast North Central Border South 
 Pres. House PID Pres. House PID Pres. House PID 
1950s 674 842 1205 899 1102 1536 87 94 224 
1960s 783 1001 1529 952 1285 1972 197 197 443 
1970s 631 1022 2023 889 1510 2657 185 275 706 
1980s 626 842 1538 931 1290 2217 136 187 372 
1990s 463 725 1440 741 1325 2215 90 157 288 
2000s 297 255 441 471 419 648 63 46 91 
 Solid South Pacific West Mountain West 
 Pres. House PID Pres. House PID Pres. House PID 
1950s 391 433 1059 240 285 459 93 114 166 
1960s 606 761 1538 347 493 808 97 135 199 
1970s 638 977 2521 369 635 1176 117 228 365 
1980s 865 1124 2568 546 712 1238 152 212 413 
1990s 745 1178 2711 372 643 1140 179 314 590 
2000s 504 374 801 285 243 415 98 79 151 
 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
Table B.4: Number of Materialist and 
Postmaterialist Respondents by Model 
(Corresponds with Tables 4.1 and 4.2) 
  1980s 1990s 2000s 
Model A       
President 1263 1418 544 
House 1376 2123 479 
Party ID 2288 3571 667 
Model B 
President 895 2174 1059
House 792 2960 894
Party ID 1181 4613 1263
Model C 
President 582 1382 535
House 512 1900 470
Party ID 759 2918 633




Table B.5: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist 
Respondents to Partisan Identification by Region and 
Decade (Corresponds to Table 4.3) 
 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Northeast 152 511 121 
North Central 213 826 167 
Border South 33 99 17 
Solid South 203 826 174 
Pacific West 130 444 107 
Mountain West 35 240 63 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
Table B.6: Number of Total Moral Values Respondents by Decade 
(Corresponds to Tables 4.4 and 4.5) 
 1980s 1990s 2000s 
President 827 1821 880 
House 1083 2939 744 
Party Identification 1760 4622 1046 
Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset 
 
Table B.7: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents to Partisan Identification by 
Region and Decade (Corresponds to Table 4.3) 
    1980s 1990s 2000s
President 158 336 157Northeast House 195 494 137
President 265 564 258North Central House 359 947 236
President 26 60 24Border South House 30 105 20
President 208 510 252Solid South House 272 805 188
President 143 227 136Pacific West House 185 383 118
President 27 124 52Mountain West House 42 205 44






Table B.8: Number of Class and Moral Values Respondents to Presidential 
Vote by Region and Decade (Corresponds to Tables 5.1 and 5.2) 
 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Total 772 1701 771 
Northeast 152 316 135 
North Central 243 521 227 
Border South 25 57 22 
Solid South 199 475 221 
Pacific West 128 219 119 
Mountain West 25 113 46 
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